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Article 3

THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF FLUCTUATING CRIMINAL
TENDENCIES AND INCAPACITATION
MURAT C. MUNGAN ∗
ABSTRACT
Economic analyses of criminal law are frequently and heavily criticized for being unable to explain many criminal law rules and doctrines people find intuitively just. Existing economic models cannot
properly explain, for instance, why criminal law distinguishes between (1) repeat offenders and first-time offenders, (2) murder and
voluntary manslaughter, and (3) remorseful and non-remorseful offenders.
This Article proposes a richer economic theory of crime that captures the rationales behind these practices and potentially behind
many other important criminal law principles and doctrines. Unlike
an overwhelming majority of previous economic analyses, my theory
accounts not only for the deterrent effect of criminal punishment, but
also for its incapacitative effect. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, it acknowledges the fact that people have fluctuating, rather than constant, criminal tendencies. That is, it recognizes that
some people who ordinarily would not consider committing a wrongful act can, in rare circumstances, lapse into committing a crime.
Surprisingly, these two simple but critical concepts have never to my
knowledge been jointly considered in an economic analysis of crime,
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even though their inclusion appears to be an obvious extension of the
standard crime and deterrence model formalized almost half a century ago by Gary Becker.
The threat of imprisonment deters crime, but even when deterrence
fails and a crime is committed, imprisonment benefits society by preventing the criminal from committing further wrongs outside prison
for the duration of the sentence. The more dangerous the criminal,
the stronger the rationale for imprisonment because these incapacitative benefits exist only if the offender would commit more crimes if left
at large. Since people have fluctuating criminal tendencies, however, the mere fact that a person committed a crime reveals imperfect information regarding his likelihood of recidivating. As such, the offender’s criminal history and the circumstances surrounding the
crime reveal important pieces of information that can be used to update our beliefs concerning the offender’s expected dangerousness—
that is, to distinguish those who have made an uncharacteristic mistake from the dangerous and reckless criminals.
Capturing the interaction between the incapacitation function of
imprisonment and potential offenders’ fluctuating criminal tendencies allows the model to supply specific, consequentialist justifications for repeat offender laws, voluntary manslaughter laws, and the
treatment of remorse in criminal law. Going forward, this more nuanced approach will provide a clearer lens through which to view
other pervasive elements of criminal law, such as the mens rea requirement, and to revisit the normative prescriptions of the previous
generation of economic analyses.
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INTRODUCTION
Law and economics (“L&E”) has become one of the dominant
approaches to analyzing legal subjects, 1 including criminal law, 2 but
has also been one of the most controversial—especially in criminal
3
law. Paralleling and sometimes intersecting the ongoing scholarly

1. See Francesco Parisi, Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law and Economics,
18 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 259 (2004), who states:
In many respects, the impact of law and economics has exceeded its planned
ambitions. One effect of the incorporation of economics into the study of law
was to irreversibly transform traditional legal methodology. Legal rules began to
be studied as a working system—a clear change from the Langdellian tradition,
which had relied almost exclusively on the self-contained framework of case
analysis and classification, viewing law as little more than a filing system. Economics provided the analytical rigor necessary for the study of the vast body of
legal rules present in a modern legal system. This intellectual revolution came at
an appropriate time, when legal academia was actively searching for a tool that
permitted critical appraisal of the law, rather than merely strengthening the
dogmatic consistencies of the system.
Id. at 261; see also Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Law and Economics as a Pillar of Legal Education 1 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., L&E Working Paper No. 11-35, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1907760 (discussing “the role of
economists in the faculty at major law schools, the influence of law and economics on legal
scholarship, and the substantive areas of economics that intersect with legal issues”); Ben
Depoorter & Jef Demot, The Cross-Atlantic Law and Economics Divide: A Dissent, 2011 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1593, 1594–97 (2011) (discussing the success of L&E as a discipline and comparing
its use in law schools in the United States versus Europe).
2. The L&E approach has been applied to study crime and criminal law by lawyers as
well as economists, and this line of research continues to attract the attention of numerous
scholars.

See, e.g., Nuno Garoupa, The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement, 11 J. ECON.

SURVEYS 267, 291–95 (1997) [hereinafter Garoupa, Optimal Law Enforcement] (citing references); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of
Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 73–76 (2000) [hereinafter Polinsky & Shavell, Economic
Theory of Law Enforcement] (same); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 450–54 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) [hereinafter Polinsky & Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law]
(same); CRIMINAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 432–36 (Nuno Garoupa ed., 2009) (same).
3. See, e.g., Nuno Garoupa, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Crime: A Critical Review, 15
EUR. J.L. & ECON 5, 5 (2003) (“Within the law and economics controversy, the economic
approach to crime has been one of the most challenged subjects. The skepticism towards
economic research on crime and criminal law has been widely expressed by criminologists
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exchange over consequentialist and retributive theories of criminal
4
punishment, there has long been heated debate over the useful5
6
ness —and even legitimacy —of economic analysis of criminal law.

and sociologists.”) (footnote omitted); Jules L. Coleman, Crimes and Transactions, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 921, 926 (2000) (“I am denying simply that the economist of law can give anything
resembling a plausible explanation of our criminal law.”); Paul H. Robinson & John M.
Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEG.
STUDIES 173 (2004) [hereinafter Robinson & Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter?] (expressing
skepticism over the deterrent effect of criminal law); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley,
The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best,
91 GEO. L.J. 949, 950–53 (2003) [hereinafter Robinson & Darley, Role of Deterrence] (questioning the deterrent effect of specific rules in criminal justice systems, potential offenders’ knowledge of legal rules, and potential offenders’ ability to use their knowledge of legal rules to guide their decisions). For an additional view, see William L. Barnes, Jr.,
Revenge on Utilitarianism: Renouncing a Comprehensive Economic Theory of Crime and Punishment, 74 IND. L.J. 627 (1999), who debates the appropriateness of assumptions used in L&E
analyses of criminal law:
I will then examine some additional assumptions made by law and economics
scholars: that behavior can be best explained by assuming that people weigh the
costs and benefits of any action and choose the action that provides the greatest
utility (the “rational actor” assumption); and that an economic analysis provides
a complete explanation of any field of law (the “universality” assumption). I will
show that these assumptions are particularly ill-suited to an analysis of criminal
law, and that they, like the deterrence assumption, detract from the usefulness of
the economic theory.
Id. at 628.
4. Retributivists frequently point out that consequentialism does not provide a principled account for why innocent people should not be punished. See, e.g., Russell L. Cristopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 848–
49 (2002) (summarizing retributivist criticisms directed at consequentialist theories of
punishment, and “seek[ing] to turn back retributivism’s principal criticisms of the consequentialist theory onto itself”). The failure by consequentialism to justify adherence to
this pervasive criminal law principle was used by retributivists to question the normative
appeal of utilitarian theories. See, e.g., Dan Markel, Retributive Justice and the Demands of
Democratic Citizenship, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 43 n.111 (2012) (criticizing utilitarian welfarism).
As briefly discussed in this Article, a similar method was used by L&E critics to question the
normative appeal of economic analyses of criminal law.
5. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 3, at 627–28 (discussing “the limits of the economic
model as a useful tool for enhancing our understanding of the criminal law”); Claire
Finkelstein, The Inefficiency of Mens Rea, 88 CAL. L. REV. 895, 896 (2000) (noting that there
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Pioneers of L&E, including Richard Posner, Mitchell Polinsky,
and Steven Shavell, rigorously applied the L&E methodology to assess
7
the desirability of various criminal laws and procedures. On the other hand, prominent legal scholars such as Jules Coleman and Claire
Finkelstein have expressed enormous skepticism toward the L&E ap8
proach. Scholars in the latter camp focused on the inability of the
L&E approach to provide explanations for a number of criminal law
9
doctrines with popular and intuitive appeal and concluded on that
10
basis that L&E is ill-suited for analyzing criminal law.
No single article is likely to resolve the larger philosophical differences separating the two camps, but in this Article I will attempt to
demonstrate that this core criticism, at least, is unwarranted. To do
11
so, I develop a richer L&E theory that is capable of explaining the

are “fundamental features of economic analysis that make it ill-suited to explain the existence of the criminal law’s mens rea requirement”).
6. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 3, at 927–30 (arguing that “the economic analyst’s
conceptualization of [criminal law] is fundamentally flawed”); Finkelstein, supra note 5, at
896 (criticizing economic analysis of criminal law).
7. See PIONEERS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Lloyd R. Cohen & Joshua D. Wright eds.,
2011) (reviewing the academic contributions of pioneers of L&E, including Posner, Polinsky and Shavell).
8. See supra notes 3 and 5.
9. See, e.g., Finkelstein, supra note 5, at 896 (arguing that economics is incapable of
explaining “the existence of the criminal law’s mens rea requirement”); see also Dan M.
Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 269, 304–05 (1996) (discussing the limits of the “narrow consequentialist[]” approach, used frequently in normative economic analyses, in providing an explanation for
the treatment of voluntary manslaughter in criminal law).
10. See, for example, Finkelstein, supra note 5, who states:
If I am correct, both about the core of mens rea and about the inability of economic analysis to explain it, the prospect of an economic analysis of the notion
of crime seems dim. For if a knowledge requirement cannot be explained in
economic terms, and if knowledge is as pervasive a requirement as I believe it to
be, then economic analysis would be unable to explain the basic structure of
criminal wrongs.
Id. at 898; see also, e.g., Barnes, supra note 3, at 627 (“Since Gary Becker’s seminal article,
various scholars have either endeavored to resolve the economic model’s inherent inconsistencies or have rejected the model entirely” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).
11. Developing a richer L&E theory necessitates the elimination of simplifying assumptions in prior L&E analyses. It should be noted, however, that using simplifying as-
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social benefits of numerous pervasive criminal law rules and doctrines. Specifically, I construct an economic model of criminal law
that incorporates two simple facts: (1) one’s tendency to commit a
12
crime or crimes fluctuates over time, and (2) imprisonment reduces
13
crime through its incapacitation effect. I illustrate that the interaction between these two simple facts is so crucial that L&E models that
ignore one or both are incapable of capturing the usefulness of important phenomena in criminal law. As such, it is the exclusion of
these factors, and not any inherent unsuitability of the approach, that
is responsible for some of the criticized failures of economic analyses
of criminal law.
Surprisingly, these two facts have never to my knowledge been
jointly accounted for in existing normative L&E analyses of criminal
14
15
law since its inception by Gary Becker in 1968. In fact, an oversumptions may provide many advantages, including allowing tractability by isolating various issues. In fact, the success of the L&E approach is due, at least in part, to its ability to
formulate discrete hypotheses by making harmless and simplified assumptions.
12. Professor Robert Cooter, to the best of my knowledge, was the first to formalize a
similar point in the L&E literature. See Robert D. Cooter, Lapses, Conflict, and Akrasia in
Torts and Crimes: Towards an Economic Theory of the Will, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 149, 149–
51 (1991) (constructing an L&E model where people occasionally lapse and commit
crime); see also Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 1977–79 (2001)
(building a framework which assumes that people have “calm” preferences and “emotion
state” preferences, which implies that they have varying degrees of control over their actions at different points in time). See infra Part IV for a discussion of fluctuating criminal
tendencies in further detail.
13. See Steven D. Levitt, Why Do Increased Arrest Rates Appear to Reduce Crime: Deterrence,
Incapacitation, or Measurement Error?, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 353, 353–55 (1998) (analyzing deterrence and incapacitation effects of imprisonment); Daniel Kessler & Steven D. Levitt,
Using Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish Between Deterrence and Incapacitation, 42 J.L. &
ECON. 343, 343–46 (1999) (same); see also Steven D. Levitt & Thomas J. Miles, Empirical
Study of Criminal Punishment, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 455, 471–74 (A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (summarizing empirical studies distinguishing the deterrence and incapacitation effects of imprisonment in reducing crime).
14. See infra Part III for a review of trends in L&E analyses of criminal behavior.
15. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968); see also Nuno Garoupa, The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement, 38 ECON. INQUIRY 278, 278 (2000) [hereinafter Garoupa, Organized Crime] (“The
economic analysis of crime has its starting point with Becker’s [1968] seminal work”) (alteration in original). It should be noted, however, that as early as the eighteenth century,
Montesquieu, Beccaria, and Bentham, without using tools from modern microeconomics,
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whelming majority of previous analyses assume that criminals have
16
constant tendencies to commit crime and that the only benefit of
17
But an analysis that does not
imprisonment is deterrence.
acknowledge fluctuating criminal tendencies overlooks the fact that
even calm and peaceful people may, even if rarely, lapse into commit18
ting crimes. Moreover, a framework that ignores the incapacitation
provided insights that resemble the ideas presented by Becker and other L&E scholars.
CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Henry Paolucci trans., Bobbs Merril
Educ. Publ’g 1978) (1764); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Clarendon Press, rev. ed. 1823) (1789); BARON DE
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (D. Appleton & Co. ed., 1900) (1748). Some of
Bentham’s ideas have striking similarities to those presented by Becker, although Becker
appears to have had no knowledge of Bentham’s ideas when he started thinking about the
economic analysis of crime. See Richard A. Posner, Bentham’s Influence on the Law and Economics Movement, in 51 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 425, 431–32 (1998) (noting the similarities between the two but noting, “I have it on good authority—namely from Becker himself—that when he began thinking about the economics of crime, he was unaware of
Bentham’s discussion of it”); see also Polinsky & Shavell, Economic Theory of Law Enforcement,
supra note 2, at 45 (discussing the contributions of Montesquieu, Beccaria, and Bentham
to the economics of criminal law enforcement).
16. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 12, at 1984 (“Economists usually assume that preferences remain stable over the period of time relevant to analysis.”); see also Garoupa, Optimal Law Enforcement, supra note 2, at 287 (surveying economic models of law enforcement
and criminal law where constant criminal tendencies are typically assumed); Polinsky &
Shavell, Economic Theory of Law Enforcement, supra note 2, at 47–51 (same); Polinsky &
Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2 (same). Part III discusses constant criminal
tendencies in further detail.
17. There are a few normative L&E articles focusing on the incapacitation effect of
punishment without considering fluctuating criminal tendencies. See, e.g., Steven Shavell,
A Model of Optimal Incapacitation, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 107 (1987) [hereinafter Shavell, Optimal Incapacitation]; Thomas J. Miceli, A Model of Criminal Sanctions That Incorporate Both Deterrence and Incapacitation, 107 ECON. LETTERS 205 (2010) [hereinafter Miceli, Deterrence and
Incapacitation]; Thomas J. Miceli, Deterred or Detained? A Unified Model of Criminal Punishment
(Univ. Conn. Dep’t Econ., Working Paper 2009-16, 2009), available at http://www.econ.
uconn.edu/working/2009-16.pdf [hereinafter Miceli, Deterred or Detained?]; Thomas J.
Miceli, Deterrence and Incapacitation Models of Criminal Punishment: Can the Twain Meet?
(Univ. Conn. Dep’t Econ., Working Paper 2009-25, 2009) [hereinafter Miceli, Can the
Twain Meet?], available at http://www.econ.uconn.edu/working/2009-25.pdf). Alternatively, some articles consider variants of fluctuating criminal tendencies without considering
incapatitation. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 12, at 149–51.
18. See supra note 12.
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function of imprisonment fails to recognize that, under the standard
consequentialist account, we punish not just to deter future misconduct, but also to segregate a dangerous person from society, so that he
19
can no longer act as a threat. Therefore, it is only natural for previous economic analyses of crime to fail to capture the information exploiting features of various criminal law practices.
A rule or mechanism is capable of exploiting information if it
can, on average, distinguish between individuals based on their likeli20
hoods of recidivating and punish them accordingly. Practices such
21
as (1) punishing repeat offenders more severely, (2) punishing re22
morseful offenders less severely, and (3) punishing voluntary man-

19. See Shavell, supra note 17, at 107–09 (constructing an economic model of incapacitation where social benefits from imprisonment increase with the dangerousness of the
offender). This argument has a caveat that was pointed out by Isaac Ehrlich: Criminals can
continue to commit wrongful acts in prison. Isaac Ehrlich, On the Usefulness of Controlling
Individuals: An Economic Analysis of Rehabilitation, Incapacitation, and Deterrence, 71 AM. ECON.
REV. 307, 315 (1981).
20. There is a related literature on selective incapacitation, which focuses on the possibility of “discriminat[ing] among offenders on the basis of predicted risk by using” proxies for offenders’ dangerousness that differ from those being used in the criminal justice
system. PETER W. GREENWOOD, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION xx (1982). My objective is not
to suggest the use of such proxies, but to focus on existing practices in criminal law, and to
show that L&E can explain their social desirability. It should also be noted that information-exploiting features of repeat offender laws have attracted the interest of noneconomists. Although I am unaware of normative L&E analyses of optimal law enforcement
that focus on the information-exploiting features of these laws, there are articles that provide simple simulations, some of which make the descriptive point that short prison terms
can be sufficient to incapacitate dangerous offenders. Cf., e.g., Linda S. Beres & Thomas
D. Griffith, Do Three Strike Laws Make Sense? Habitual Offender Statutes and Criminal Incapacitation, 87 GEO. L.J. 103, 138 (1998) (concluding that longer prison terms can only achieve
a modest reduction in crime).
21. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (2011) (displaying sentencing
table, which imposes harsher penalties for repeat offenders); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell, On Offense History and the Theory of Deterrence, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 305,
305 (1998) [hereinafter Polinsky & Shavell, On Offense History] (“In practice, the law often
sanctions repeat offenders more severely than first-time offenders.”). The authors also
provide a number of examples of laws requiring harsher penalties for repeat offenders. Id.
at 305–06.
22. See infra Part III.B.2.
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23

slaughter less severely than murder can be viewed as information
exploiting mechanisms. Previous L&E models cannot provide satisfying rationales for these practices because they overlook their infor24
mation-exploiting features.

23. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(2). (designating voluntary manslaughter as a
“felony of the second degree”); see also Posner, supra note 12, at 1995 n.34 (briefly discussing conditions under which heat of passion killings were excused in Roman law); Kahan &
Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 305–23 (discussing the conditions under which murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter in common law and existing scholarship attempting to
provide rationales for such reduction).
24. Existing L&E analyses of repeat offender laws provide mixed and qualified results,
ranging from less severe to equal or more severe punishments for repeat offenders. See,
e.g., Murat C. Mungan, Repeat Offenders: If They Learn, We Punish Them More Severely, 30 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 173 (2010) [hereinafter Mungan, Repeat Offenders] (deriving optimal sanction schemes for repeat offenders when they can learn how to escape detection through
their past experiences with the criminal justice system, and suggesting that repeat offenders ought to be punished more severely than first time offenders only if such learning effects are significant); Polinsky & Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2, at 438
(demonstrating that uniform sanctions are optimal when adequate deterrence can be
achieved, and observing that “only if deterrence is inadequate is it possibly desirable to
condition sanctions on offense history”); Winand Emons, A Note on the Optimal Punishment
for Repeat Offenders, 23 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 253 (2003) (concluding that “[t]he optimal
sanction scheme is decreasing rather than increasing in the number of offenses” when
“agents . . . follow history-dependent strategies” and a few other conditions are met); Polinsky & Shavell, On Offense History, supra note 21, at 305–07 (deriving optimal sanction
schemes for repeat offenders and concluding that it is optimal to punish repeat offenders
and young first-time offenders with the same sanction, and to punish old first-time offenders less severely than the former two). Part III.B.1 provides a more detailed discussion of
the discrepancies between implications of economic analyses of criminal law and existing
laws concerning the punishment of repeat offenders. Similarly, consequentialist analyses
generally suggest that remorse ought to be irrelevant in the determination of sanctions.
See, e.g., Bryan H. Ward, Sentencing Without Remorse, 38 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 131, 132 (2006)
(arguing that “remorse should not be relevant in criminal sentencing”); Murat C. Mungan,
Don’t Say You’re Sorry Unless You Mean It: Pricing Apologies to Achieve Credibility, 32 INT’L REV.
L. & ECON. 178, 178, 181 n.20 (2012) [hereinafter Mungan, Apologies] (arguing that remorse is ordinarily mere “cheap talk” and that taking remorse seriously “makes little sense”
from a utilitarian point of view if one “abstracts from issues related to the incapacitation
function of imprisonment”). To the best of my knowledge, there is no economic model of
law enforcement suggesting that voluntary manslaughter ought to be punished less severely than murder.

166

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:156

To address this shortcoming, I argue for modifying the standard
economic model of crime and deterrence in two ways: (1) replacing
the assumption of constant criminal tendencies with the assumption
of fluctuating criminal tendencies, and (2) accounting for the fact that
imprisonment lowers crime by segregating criminals from the rest of
the society. To explain the first proposed modification, consider the
standard L&E model of crime in which people have constant criminal
tendencies. The standard model unrealistically assumes that a person’s illicit benefit from committing a given act is constant over time
25
and that he has perfect self-control. As such, the model assumes that
people consistently make the same choices over illegal and legal options. They do not, for instance, park legally today and park illegally
tomorrow, unless the expected fine for illegal parking changes over
time. Fortunately, existing tools in economics can be used to replace
this false assumption with a more realistic one: fluctuating criminal
tendencies. This new assumption embodies the common belief that,
as one court observed in 1859, crimes may occur “from the infirmity
26
of passion to which even good men are subject.”
The explanation of the second proposed modification requires a
brief description of trends in economic analyses of criminal law. An
overwhelming majority of economic analyses of criminal law focus on
deterrence and ignore other potential justifications for punishment,
including incapacitation. Needless to say, the incapacitation function
27
of punishment contributes to reductions in crime rates. Such incapacitation benefits, however, are largely ignored in normative economic analyses of criminal law because their inclusion has not been
seen to dramatically alter the implications of standard crime and de28
terrence models. But, as I demonstrate, a richer economic model
incorporating fluctuating criminal tendencies provides simple and
powerful rationales for existing practices, which the standard model
cannot explain. A repeat offender’s criminal record reveals that it is
unlikely that he is a person who, under unusual circumstances, failed
to exert control over temptations to commit a crime. Instead, it is
much more probable that he is a person who has a high tendency to
25. See supra note 16.
26. State v. Cook, 1859 WL 4467, at *144 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1859), rev’d, 1859 WL 4465
(Ohio Dist. 1859) (emphasis added).
27. See supra note 13.
28. See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 17; Miceli, Deterrence and Incapacitation, supra note 17;
Miceli, Deterred or Detained?, supra note 17; see infra Part III for a discussion of this point in
further detail.
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commit crime. Therefore, if not imprisoned, he is more likely than a
first-time offender to commit subsequent crimes. As such, due to the
high benefits from incapacitation, penalty enhancements for repeat
offenders are justified. Similarly, a truly remorseful offender is less
likely to commit his previous wrongs under similar conditions in the
future. Therefore, he is unlikely to recidivate and incapacitation
benefits from imprisonment are minimal. Accordingly, it is desirable
29
to punish truly remorseful offenders less severely. Finally, a person
who commits a crime in the heat of passion is likely to have committed the crime due to extreme emotional stimuli. If so, the mere fact
that he committed the crime reveals relatively little information about
his dangerousness absent those stimuli. Expected incapacitation benefits from punishing him are small compared to similar benefits from
punishing a criminal who committed an illegal act without provocation. As such, reduced penalties for voluntary manslaughter are justified.
30
All explanations provided above rely on similar rationales.
Once fluctuating criminal tendencies are incorporated, the mere fact
that a person committed a crime reveals imperfect information about
his dangerousness. The circumstances surrounding the crime reveal
important pieces of information that can be used to update our beliefs concerning offenders’ dangerousness. Since expected incapacitative benefits are greater for more dangerous offenders, the more
strongly we believe—based on the circumstances surrounding the
crime—that the criminal is dangerous, the stronger an L&E approach
suggests that he should be imprisoned. We should be more skeptical,

29. One may naturally question whether courts can distinguish truly remorseful offenders from offenders who “fake remorse.” It is plausible to assume that perfectly separating remorseful and non-remorseful offenders is impossible. This is the primary reason
why the deterrence-based economic analysis, in which there is no direct social benefit to
punishing truly remorseful offenders less severely, suggests that sentence reductions for
successfully asserting remorse are generally suboptimal. See, e.g., Mungan, Apologies, supra
note 24, at 178 (arguing against reducing sentencing for assertions of remorse). If, however, as argued in Section V there are benefits to punishing truly remorseful offenders less
severely, a trade-off emerges between obtaining such benefits and costs due to nonseparability problems. This suggests that sentence reductions for those who convincingly
display remorse are justified in a broader range of conditions. Part V.B discusses remorse
and apologies in further detail.
30. These rationales rely on what can formally be called Bayesian updating, which is
described more formally and in further detail in note 193.
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in turn, of harsh sentences for individuals who demonstrate a low
propensity for crime.
Beyond offering an efficiency rationale for these existing practices, correcting the standard model has significant descriptive and
normative implications for the economic theory of criminal law. Although future work will focus on determining the extent to which accounting for the information-exploiting features of criminal law leads
to results different from those obtained under the standard model, I
will make two preliminary observations here.
First, existing economic models of crime and deterrence frequently have been used to advocate for the necessity of harsh criminal
31
justice policies. As briefly discussed above and explained in further
detail in the proceeding Parts, a richer economic model of crime, as
presented in this Article, suggests that first-time offenders ought to be
treated leniently, and that remorseful individuals and criminals acting
in the heat of passion ought to be punished less severely. As such, this
Article suggests that harsh penalties should be reserved for individuals
who have, through their actions, demonstrated that they are likely to
recidivate.
Second, it has been previously suggested that “fundamental features of economic analysis . . . make it ill-suited to explain the exist32
I believe the
ence of the criminal law’s mens rea requirement.”
economic theory of criminal law I propose in this Article is capable of
proving this claim wrong. The mens rea requirement in criminal law
can be conceptualized as an information-exploiting device: a criminal’s mental state while committing a harmful act provides information about his likelihood of recidivating. As such, the rationales
identified in this Article suggest that criminals should be punished,
ceteris paribus, in proportion to the intentionality of their acts. Developing a complete model to conceptualize mens rea as an informationexploiting device is, however, an immense task that I cannot undertake in this Article.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a summary of
the relevant criticisms directed at economic analyses of crime and
punishment. Part II briefly explains how economic analyses of crime
31. See John J. Donohue III, Economic Models of Crime and Punishment, 74 SOC. RES. 379,
380 (2007) (explaining how Gary Becker’s 1968 article “started to powerfully influence
criminal justice policy in the 1970s and provided the intellectual support for . . . the increasing harshness of the American criminal justice system over the last 30 years.” (citing
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968))).
32. Finkelstein, supra note 5, at 896.
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and punishment have focused on deterrence and have largely ignored
other potential consequentialist justifications for punishment, such as
rehabilitation and incapacitation. In Part III, I explain how economic
models assume constant criminal benefits. Section IV clarifies how
fluctuating criminal tendencies can be incorporated in economic
analyses of crime. Finally, in Part V, I describe how a rich model incorporating fluctuating criminal benefits and incapacitation benefits
of imprisonment provides rationales for existing criminal law doctrines and practices. Part VI concludes.
I. CRITICISMS DIRECTED AT ECONOMIC ANALYSES OF CRIMINAL LAW
Despite providing useful analytical tools to evaluate the desirability of numerous rules and standards, 33 L&E is frequently criticized on
various grounds. In particular, economic analyses of criminal law are
criticized for making use of unrealistic assumptions and having lim34
ited explanatory power. Before specifying these criticisms, it will be
35
useful to summarize the simple Beckerian framework, which many
L&E scholars use to analyze issues related to criminal law and proce36
dure.
A. Crime and Deterrence Model: The Beckerian Framework
In 1968, Gary Becker provided a framework to analyze criminal
decision-making by using modern economics. 37 After his great contribution, many scholars started analyzing various issues in criminal
38
law by adopting his framework. In the simplest form of the Beckeri-

33. See supra note 1.
34. See supra notes 3, 5 and 9.
35. A variant of this framework was presented by Bentham in 1789. But Becker provided the first formal model by using modern economic tools. See supra note 15.
36. See Garoupa, Organized Crime, supra note 15 (applying a Beckerian framework);
Garoupa, Optimal Law Enforcement, supra note 2, at 267–69 (same); Polinsky & Shavell, Economic Theory of Law Enforcement, supra note 2, at 46–48 (same); see also Polinsky & Shavell,
Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2, at 405 (surveying economic models of law enforcement developed subsequent to Becker’s article).
37. Becker, supra note 15; see also Garoupa, Organized Crime, supra note 15; Donohue,
supra note 31, at 381–85.
38. See Garoupa, Optimal Law Enforcement, supra note 2, at 267–69 (utilizing a Beckerian analysis); Polinsky & Shavell, Economic Theory of Law Enforcement, supra note 2, at 46–48
(utilizing a Beckerian analysis); Polinsky & Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2
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an model, a fraction of society consists of potential offenders, and a
potential offender is a person who benefits from the commission of a
39
crime and dislikes being punished. Offenders are assumed to know
the probability (p) with which they will be caught if they commit a
crime and the sanction (s) that they will be subject to if caught.
In this framework, a potential offender is assumed to commit a
crime only if the benefit from the crime (b) exceeds the expected
40
sanction (p x s). Because it is assumed that potential offenders differ
from each other in their criminal benefits, it follows that only offend41
ers with b > (p x s) commit crime. This model is then used to evaluate various law enforcement mechanisms and to derive optimal poli42
cies.
It should be noted that Beckerian models do not rule out the
possibility that potential offenders, when making decisions, may take
into account moral or sociological considerations. The variable b is
interpreted as incorporating all considerations related to the commis(surveying economic models of law enforcement developed subsequent to Becker’s article).
39. One may question whether under this definition everyone in society is a potential
offender. This does not follow, because, as explained in the proceeding portion of this
Part, benefits include non-monetary considerations; therefore, not all individuals benefit
from the commission of a crime. I elaborate further on this and related points in Part III
and IV.
40. This is true in the simplest form of Beckerian models. In more sophisticated
models that incorporate criminals’ risk preferences, criminals are assumed to make decisions by comparing expected utilities rather than expected values. See, for example, Donohue,
supra note 31, at 328–83, for an informative discussion on criminals’ risk preferences and
how risk preferences may appear in Beckerian models. See also Jeffrey Grogger, Certainty
vs. Severity of Punishment, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 297, 297–98 (1991) (reconciling conflicting
findings from prior research on the effect of the certainty of punishment and the severity
of punishment on crime rates); Michael K. Block & Vernon E. Gerety, Some Experimental
Evidence on Differences Between Student and Prisoner Reactions to Monetary Penalties and Risk, 24
J. LEGAL STUD. 123, 123–24 (1995) (employing an empirical model to study criminals’ risk
preferences). For purposes of demonstrating what constant benefits mean, it is sufficient
to focus on simpler models.
41. An earlier version of this statement dates back to 1789. See Posner, supra note 15,
at 431 (“Bentham had made a number of important economic points in the Introduction: a
person commits a crime only if the pleasure he anticipates from the crime exceeds the anticipated pain . . . .”).
42. See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2, at 450–54 (listing a number of articles using this approach).
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sion of a crime; a potential offender’s benefit is not limited to monetary or pecuniary gains.
Implicit in the Beckerian framework is the idea that people, even
criminals, respond to incentives. A potential criminal compares the
benefits to expected losses, and decides whether or not to commit a
crime. Although this idea sounds intuitive—and is trivially true to
43
many economists —it is the basis for many criticisms aimed at economic analyses of crime.
B. The Deterrability Assumption
Simple Beckerian models imagine a world where every individual
can be deterred from committing crime. This deterrence can potentially be achieved through the threat of punishment. Using the previously introduced notation, I deduce that for any individual who has a
benefit of b from crime there generally is an expected sanction (p x s)
44
exceeding his benefit, and therefore capable of deterring him.
This feature of simple Beckerian models is the focal point of
45
many criticisms. Many scholars make the observation that it may be
impossible to deter a particular individual from committing crime
under many circumstances. A person who is intoxicated or finds his
wife in bed with a stranger may not consider the expected punishment associated with committing a crime, even if fully aware of the se46
verity and certainty of punishment.

43. Many economists interpret this as a simple application of the “revealed preference” concept. See Hal R. Varian, Revealed Preference, in SAMUELSONIAN ECONOMICS AND
THE

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 99–115 (Michael Szenberg, Lall Ramrattan & Aron A.

Gottesman eds., 2006) (providing a survey of revealed preference analysis and explaining
the concept in detail).
44. In the rare case where a potential offender does not value his life much, it may be
impossible to deter him through punishment. Ignoring the possibility of torture, let s be
the upper bound for punishment (for example, the death penalty). In this case, it is impossible to deter an individual for whom b>ps. But, even in those rare cases, deterrence
can theoretically, although impracticably, be achieved by offering the potential offender
something of greater value than what he has to gain through crime, on the condition that
he abstains from committing crime.
45. See supra notes 3, 5, 9, and 10 and accompanying text.
46. See Robinson & Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter?, supra note 3, at 178–82 (discussing
the “Rational Choice Hurdle” and arguing that “[b]ehavioural scientists who study the decision-making patterns of people now realize that being able to demonstrate that a person
has some knowledge of various facts that could be relevant to a decision does not mean
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The idea that people often do not consider costs when making
decisions, or heavily discount them, is also supported by recent research in behavioral L&E. This line of research points out that many
people suffer from what is called bounded willpower, and that they face
difficulties in delaying gratification, even when they know that doing
47
so will serve their long-term self-interest. As such, insights from behavioral L&E support the claim that the basic assumption that people
are deterrable is not globally applicable.
C. Common Knowledge Assumption
Another assumption that is commonly invoked in simple Beckerian models is that potential criminals have perfect knowledge about
48
the expected punishment associated with various crimes. Using the
49
previous notation, a potential criminal is assumed to know the certainty (p) and severity of punishment (s). But is this really true?

that those facts are recalled, and mobilized appropriately, by the decision-maker”); see also
Posner, supra note 12, at 1993–94 (claiming that people experiencing intense anger cannot be deterred). But see, e.g., Miceli, Deterred or Detained?, supra note 17, at 1 (“Central to
[Beckerian Models], and crucial for deterrence to be possible, is the rational offender assumption, which maintains that would-be criminals decide whether or not to commit a
crime by comparing the gains from the illegal act to the expected punishment. Although
some may doubt the validity of this assumption, there is ample empirical evidence to support it.” (citing Levitt and Miles, supra note 13)).
47. See infra Part IV.C (discussing, in further detail, bounded willpower and other issues analyzed in behavioral L&E).
48. See Robinson & Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter?, supra note 3, at 175–78 (discussing
the “Legal Knowledge Hurdle” and stating: “To sum up, people rarely know the criminal
law rules, even when those rules are formulated under the express assumption that they
will influence conduct”). It should be noted that there are, even if very few, economic
analyses of law enforcement incorporating the fact that not all individuals are informed of
legal rules and procedures. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individuals, and Acquiring Information About Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
93, 93 (1990) (discussing the significance of individuals’ “lack of knowledge about legal
rules”); Murat C. Mungan, Optimal Warning Strategies: Punishment Ought Not to Be Inflicted
Where the Penal Provision Is Not Properly Conveyed, at 1 (Fla. State Univ. College of Law, Public
Law Research Paper No. 505, 2012) [hereinafter Mungan, Optimal Warning Strategies],
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1803275 (“When uninformed individuals are present and the punishment of the innocent is assumed to be costly, there is a trade-off between such costs and reduced levels of deterrence.”).
49. See supra Part I.A.
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Many scholars argue that potential criminals may not be very responsive to increases in the certainty and severity of punishment. According to a study conducted by Professor David A. Anderson, “76%
of active criminals and 89% of the most violent criminals either perceive no risk of apprehension or are incognizant of the likely pun50
ishments for their crimes.” Anderson’s study is cited for the proposition that criminals are not as informed about criminal law as is
51
commonly assumed.
Furthermore, new insights from behavioral L&E studies suggest
that people may possess cognitive biases, such as optimism and overconfidence, which prevent them from objectively assessing the proba52
bility with which they can experience negative events. These studies
cast further doubt on the validity of the common knowledge assumption, which is frequently invoked in economic analyses of law enforcement.
D. Problematic Implications
In short, many normative economic analyses of criminal law invoke assumptions concerning the deterrent effect of punishment
schemes that are not applicable in all situations. This naturally raises
questions as to whether normative implications of analyses invoking
53
false assumptions can be taken seriously. Because most economic
54
analyses of crime rely on a deterrence-based theory of punishment,

50. David A. Anderson, The Deterrence Hypothesis and Picking Pockets at the Pickpocket’s
Hanging, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 295, 295 (2002); see also Richard H. McAdams & Thomas
Ulen, Behavioral Criminal Law and Economics, in CRIMINAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 414–15
(Nuno Garoupa ed., 2009) (briefly reviewing other empirical studies that suggest the
common knowledge assumption does not globally hold). But see, e.g., Miceli, Deterred or
Detained?, supra note 17, at 1 (claiming that “there is ample empirical evidence to support”
the assumption that offenders act rationally).
51. See Robinson & Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter?, supra note 3, at 176 (citing Anderson, supra note 50, for this proposition).
52. See infra Part IV.C (discussing cognitive biases, such as overconfidence and optimism, and listing a number of relevant articles analyzing related behavioral issues).
53. See, e.g., Robinson & Darley, The Role of Deterrence, supra note 3, at 952 (“Formulating criminal law rules according to a deterrence analysis can produce erroneous results if
based upon missing or unreliable data.”).
54. See infra Part II for my summary of how economic theories of law enforcement
focus mainly on deterrence.
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their explanatory power will naturally be limited if their assumptions
concerning the deterrent role of punishment are false.
Perhaps this is the reason why there are numerous tensions between the implications of simple economic analyses of crime and existing practices in criminal law. In particular, as explained in Part III,
economic analyses are unable to provide satisfying rationales as to (1)
why repeat offenders are punished more severely than first time offenders, (2) why there is a de facto tendency to punish less severely,
and (3) why offenders who commit voluntary manslaughter are punished less severely than offenders who commit murder.
Do these observations imply that economic analyses of criminal
law can never be useful? Not necessarily. First, it should be noted
that if assumptions concerning the deterrent effect of punishment
schemes often, even if not always, hold, then such assumptions are
not very harmful. Second, even assuming, arguendo, that most criminals do not react to incentives, economic analyses can provide useful
insights by focusing on nondeterrence-based consequentialist theories
of punishment, such as incapacitation. Third, economic analyses of
criminal law can incorporate the fact that not all individuals can be
55
deterred through threats of punishment. In fact, as Part V demonstrates, an economic analysis of criminal law that focuses on the second and third points provides satisfying rationales for some of the
legal practices most people find intuitive and fair.
Before proceeding, however, it is useful to provide a brief summary of economic theories based on deterrence compared to other
theories of punishment. This brief review serves several important
functions. First, it reveals the lack of interest shown to nondeterrence theories. Second, it allows the identification of different
types of social benefits through deterrence versus incapacitation. Deterrence lowers present crime rates by making crime a costly option
for potential offenders. Incapacitation, on the other hand, lowers future crime rates by making it impossible for criminals to commit subsequent crimes while imprisoned. Third, it hints at how the explanatory power of economic analyses of crime can be increased by jointly
focusing on the incapacitative and deterrent effects of punishment.
On one hand, an exclusively deterrence-based theory cannot provide
justifications for imprisoning dangerous and undeterrable individuals
for trivial reasons. On the other hand, an exclusively incapacitation55. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 48 (incorporating into economic analyses of law enforcement the fact that some individuals may be uninformed of legal rules and procedures).
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based theory cannot provide satisfying rationales as to why minor offenses receive monetary fines, rather than imprisonment. This follows from the simple fact that monetary fines do not have an incapacitative function.
II. DETERRENCE, INCAPACITATION AND REHABILITATION IN NORMATIVE
ECONOMIC ANALYSES OF CRIMINAL LAW
It is only natural for economic analyses of crime to focus on some
or all of the three main consequentialist justifications for punishment:
56
deterrence, rehabilitation and incapacitation. But, as discussed below, economic theories of crime and law enforcement focus predom57
inantly on deterrence and pay very little attention to rehabilitation
and incapacitation.
In this Article, I focus on the incapacitation and deterrence functions of punishment. I refrain from commenting on potential rehabilitative effects, primarily because “[i]ncarceration rarely is imposed
58
today for rehabilitative (reform) purposes.” Unsurprisingly, normative economic analyses take a similar approach and do not focus on
the rehabilitative effects of punishment. This Part briefly presents a
variety of historical, methodological, and theoretical reasons for this
approach before proceeding to lengthier reviews of L&E analyses focusing on incapacitation and deterrence.

56. See, e.g., Ehrlich, supra note 19, at 311 (observing that “[t]he three basic measures
of crime control most frequently discussed in the criminological literature are deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation”).
57. See Barnes, supra note 3, at 628 (suggesting that L&E scholars “bas[e] their analyses primarily on only a small part of the traditional framework—deterrence”); Miceli, Can
the Twain Meet?, supra note 17, at 1 (“Economic models of law enforcement beginning with
Becker (1968) have primarily focused on the role of criminal punishment in deterring
crime.” (citing Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968))); Polinsky & Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2, at 444 n.81
(“Economists have paid much less attention to incapacitation than to deterrence, despite
the significance of the incapacitation rationale in criminal law enforcement.”). It is also
remarkable that Polinsky and Shavell, in their extensive review of economic theories of
public enforcement of law, do not even once refer to the word “rehabilitation” except
when citing Ehrlich’s work, which contains the word “rehabilitation” in its title. Polinsky &
Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2; Ehrlich, supra note 19. This reflects the fact
that economists have largely ignored rehabilitation in their analyses, perhaps due to reasons discussed in the proceeding paragraphs.
58. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 36 (4th ed. 2007).
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A. Rehabilitation Is Ignored
Among the three potential consequentialist justifications for punishment, rehabilitation receives the least attention. This is perhaps
due to trends and developments in the 1970s, which led to the “trashing of rehabilitation.” 59 Moreover, economists may be ignoring rehabilitation due to its “counterdeterrent” effects identified by Isaac Ehrlich in his 1981 article. According to Erlich, “[t]he reason [for this
counterdeterrent effect] is that successful rehabilitation confers an
implicit subsidy on potential offenders by offering training and employment benefits at public expense. . . . [T]he rehabilitation benefits provided to actual offenders ex post produce a counterdeterrent
60
effect on potential offenders ex ante.” A third potential factor, which
may contribute to the neglect of rehabilitation by economists, has to
61
do with the problems it poses for social choice theory. Social choice

59. Francis T. Cullen & Paul Gendreau, Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and Prospects, 3 CRIM. JUST. 109, 112 (2000) (summarizing the events in the 1970s that
led to “the abandonment of, or loss of faith in, rehabilitation as a goal of corrections” and
questioning whether such abandonment “was deserved”); see also Alfred Blumstein, Interaction of Criminological Research and Public Policy, 12 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 349, 351
(1997); Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB.
INT. 22, 25 (1974) (providing a skeptical view of rehabilitative approaches, and stating that
“with few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far
have had no appreciable effect on recidivism”); Ehrlich, supra note 19, at 314 (“Numerous
studies indicate little success, if not outright failure, of most programs in bringing about
any enduring rehabilitative outcomes for treated offenders.”).
60. Ehrlich, supra note 19, at 315 (emphasis omitted). More specifically, Ehrlich argues as follows:
[T]he effect of rehabilitation on the equilibrium frequency of offenses is even
more complex. The reason is that successful rehabilitation confers an implicit
subsidy on potential offenders by offering training and employment benefits at
public expense. Even if the rehabilitation programs were not carried out at the
expense of the criminal sanctions, but rather in addition to them, the provision
of rehabilitative net benefits—to the extent that they are positive—necessarily
enhances the anticipated net return from crime to the potential offender . . . by
the magnitude of the rehabilitation subsidy per offense . . . .
Id.
61. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 787 (2003) (“The central question of [social choice] theory concerns the possibility of deriving the objectives of
the policy maker as an aggregation of the preferences of the agents in the economy, and
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theory identifies ways to aggregate individual preferences to rank the
social desirability of various options. As such, it provides the tools for
normative evaluations of rules and laws. Rehabilitation, by definition,
involves externally incited changes to a person’s preferences. This is
problematic for social choice theory because the theory commonly
62
considers members of society as having fixed preferences.
B. Incapacitation Is Rarely Analyzed
Normative L&E analyses of law enforcement that incorporate incapacitation as a justification for punishment are rare. There is only
63
one pre-2010 article by Professor Steven Shavell and three very re64
cent articles by Professor Thomas Miceli specifically focusing on incapacitation by using the standard normative L&E approach.
Shavell’s article analyzes optimal punishment schemes when incapacitation is the only function of punishment, and Miceli’s articles extend
the analysis to cases where punishment has deterrent as well as incapacitation effects. To investigate why incapacitation may have been
ignored in normative economic analyses, I first review Shavell’s 1987
article. Miceli’s articles are briefly reviewed in Part II.D, which discusses the effect of combining deterrence and incapacitation in L&E
models.
Steven Shavell conducted the single pre-2010 economic analysis
of optimal law enforcement in 1987, in which he incorporated inca-

of doing so in a manner that could be deemed as satisfactory according to a number of
desiderata.”).
62. In social choice theory, it is common to assume that members of society have “well
defined preferences,” which are not manipulated through social policies such as rehabilitation and therefore remain constant throughout analyses. Id. at 789.
63. Shavell, Optimal Incapacitation, supra note 17, is the single pre-2010 economic study
focusing specifically on incapacitation of which I am aware. I am excluding Ehrlich, supra
note 19, which also contains a brief discussion of incapacitation, but does not provide a
complete theory as does Shavell’s 1987 article. Miceli, Can the Twain Meet?, supra note 17,
and Polinsky & Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2, briefly review existing economic analyses of optimal law enforcement incorporating incapacitation as a potential justification for punishment and only cite Shavell’s 1987 article. There are, however, numerous articles that consider optimal nonmonetary fines, such as imprisonment, and justify
their use to achieve deterrence—especially when the judgment-proof-offender problem is
a significant concern. See infra note 73 for examples of three articles by Shavell.
64. Miceli, Deterrence and Incapacitation, supra note 17; Miceli, Deterred or Detained?, supra note 17; Miceli, Can the Twain Meet?, supra note 17.
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pacitation as a potential justification for punishment.
His article
suggests that an offender ought to be imprisoned if and only if his potential to cause harm, per unit of time free, exceeds the cost, per unit
66
of time, of imprisonment. It follows that if an offender’s dangerousness is constant, he should either be imprisoned for life or not
imprisoned at all. This result is in sharp contrast to existing punishment schemes, where offenders are generally punished with interme67
diate sentences. If, however, an offender’s dangerousness declines
68
with age, it is optimal to release the offender after his dangerousness
falls below a critical level. Although Shavell’s model of incapacitation,
when combined with the rehabilitative effects of aging, produces
69
some sensible results, it appears to be incapable of producing results
of similar quality and quantity to the standard deterrence model,
which was “brought to its current level of maturity by” the same au70
thor and Mitchell Polinsky.

65. For another brief review of Shavell, supra note 17, see Polinsky & Shavell, Public
Enforcement of Law, supra note 2.
66. Shavell, supra note 17, at 585–87.
67. In 2006, for example, the average felony sentence to incarceration in the United
States was three years in state prisons and jails and more than five years in the federal system. SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN
STATE COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES 2 (2009).
68. See, e.g., Levitt & Miles, supra note 13, at 460 (citing CRIMINAL CAREERS AND
“CAREER CRIMINALS” (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., vol. I 1986)); Polinsky & Shavell, Public
Enforcement of Law, supra note 2, at 443 (citing JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN,
CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE (1985)).
69. As Professors Levitt and Miles note,
the predictions of Shavell’s (1987) model are broadly consistent with observed
criminal justice policies when incapacitation is the exclusive purpose. For example, in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 372–74 (1997), the Supreme Court
upheld a state law authorizing the civil confinement of sex offenders who have
completed their criminal sentences. The Court concluded that further confinement was permissible when offenders suffered from mental abnormalities
rendering them likely to re-offend and unlikely to be deterred by the threat of
incarceration. Thus, the Court has permitted in limited circumstances confinement solely for the purpose of incapacitation.
Levitt & Miles, supra note 13, at 460.
70. Miceli, Deterred or Detained?, supra note 17, at 1 (referring to Polinsky & Shavell,
Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2; Polinsky & Shavell, Economic Theory of Law Enforcement, supra note 2).
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Consider the use of monetary fines, rather than imprisonment,
71
for minor offenses. Deterrence-based theories provide satisfying rationales as to why imprisonment should be reserved for major offenses. The harm inflicted through a minor offense is, by definition, relatively low. As such, using an expensive method of deterrence, namely
imprisonment, is not necessary to deter the infliction of such harm. A
degree of deterrence can be achieved by resorting to the exclusive use
of monetary fines. More serious crimes, however, necessitate the use
72
of imprisonment or other nonmonetary fines to increase deterrence.
It simply pays-off to incur the expense of imprisonment to marginally
reduce social harms inflicted through more serious crimes.
Theories focusing only on incapacitation do not, and cannot,
provide satisfying rationales for the exclusive use of monetary sanctions. This follows from the fact that monetary fines do not ordinarily
prevent offenders from committing subsequent crimes. A weak rationale can be provided for exceptional cases where the commission
of a crime requires some financial means or investment. But such explanations certainly cannot compare to the convincing explanations
provided by deterrence-based theories.
C. Deterrence: The Predominant Theory of Punishment
As stated earlier, deterrence is the main focus of economic theories of crime. Topics analyzed by employing economic crime and deterrence models range from the very general, such as the optimal use
73
of monetary versus non-monetary sanctions, the optimal standard of
74
75
proof in criminal trials, and the punishment of attempts to the very

71. See Polinsky & Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2, at 419 (“Under the
strict sanctioning rule . . . it never is optimal to employ a prison sentence unless the fine
has been set as high as possible, since fines are socially cheaper sanctions. Whether it is
optimal to use a prison sentence in addition to the maximal fine depends on the extent of
underdeterrence that would result if fines were used alone, and the social cost of imprisonment.”).
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Mitchell A. Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 J. PUB. ECON. 89 (1984); Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of
Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232 (1985); Steven Shavell, The
Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 584 (1987); Louis
Kaplow, A Note on the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions, 42 J. PUB. ECON. 245 (1990).
74. See, e.g., Henrik Lando, Prevention of Crime and the Optimal Standard of Proof in Criminal Law, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 33, 33 (2009); Thomas J. Miceli, Optimal Prosecution of Defend-
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specific, such as the optimal role of apologies in sentencing, and
77
sentence enhancements for hate crimes. What is common among
most normative economic analyses is the focus on the deterrent effect
of various laws and procedures, which is implied by the assumption
that potential criminals react to changes in criminal law rules. As
briefly discussed in Part I.A., normative economic theories assume
that greater expected penalties lead to more deterrence.
Increasing the expected punishment to achieve deterrence, however, is costly. The most commonly identified costs in the existing lit78
erature include detection and imprisonment. As such, a trade-off
emerges between reducing such costs and increasing deterrence.
Since there are a number of variables at work, the correct trade-off
requires a circumstance-specific approach. The standard economic
model of crime and deterrence is appealing and quite successful, at
least in part, because of its ability to generate such fact-specific tradeoffs.
Although there is a broad and sophisticated literature on the
79
economics of crime and deterrence, a few key points are worth highlighting. The main trade-off, as stated, is between reducing costs required to increase expected punishment and increasing the benefits
associated with deterrence. A few corollaries immediately follow. Ceteris paribus, the greater the harm associated with crime, the more im-

ants Whose Guilt Is Uncertain, 6 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 189, 189–90 (1990) (same); Murat C.
Mungan, A Utilitarian Justification for Heightened Standards of Proof in Criminal Trials, 167 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 352, 352 (2011); Okan Yilankaya, A Model of Evidence Production and Optimal Standard of Proof and Penalty in Criminal Trials, 35 CANADIAN J.
ECON. 385, 385 (2002); Matteo Rizzolli & Margherita Saraceno, Better That Ten Guilty Persons Escape: Punishment Costs Explain the Standard of Evidence, PUB. CHOICE (forthcoming),
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9867-y.
75. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD.
435, 436 (1990); Murat C. Mungan, Welfare Enhancing Regulation Exemptions, 31 INT’L REV.
L. & ECON. 249, 253 (2011).
76. See, e.g., Mungan, Apologies, supra note 24.
77. See, e.g., Dhammika Dharmapala & Nuno Garoupa, Penalty Enhancements for Hate
Crimes: An Economic Analysis, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 185 (2004).
78. See Polinsky & Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2, at 450–54 (listing
relevant existing literature).
79. See supra note 2 (listing scholarship on the economics of crime and deterrence).
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80

portant the benefits associated with deterrence. Similarly, all else
equal, the greater the deterrent effect of punishment, the greater the
81
justification for imposing punishment.
D. Combining Incapacitation and Deterrence?
This last observation highlights a caveat in deterrence-based theories. Consider a society consisting of two types of individuals: undeterrable criminals, and noncriminals (that is, individuals who never
commit crime). In such a society, deterrence based theories suggest
that crimes should go unpunished, because punishment would have
absolutely no deterrent effect. As such, punishment—in an economic
deterrence model—would only generate imprisonment and detection
costs, without any benefits. Therefore, in such a society, it would be
82
optimal to not punish criminal acts.
This caveat demonstrates how the standard economic model of
crime can benefit from the incorporation of the incapacitation function and benefit of punishment. Imprisoning undeterrable criminals
in such a society makes sense if one recognizes the fact that criminals
83
can repeatedly commit crime, and that the prevention of future
crime requires imprisonment, even if punishment has no effect of deterring crime in the present.
This observation leads one to ask whether an economic model
that combines deterrence and incapacitation can address the criticisms directed at previous economic analyses of crime and have suffi84
cient explanatory power. The answer is “no,” unless some of the assumptions in the standard economic model of crime can be replaced
with new and more useful ones. To see why, consider whether such a

80. See Steven Shavell, Specific Versus General Enforcement of Law, 99 J. POL. ECON. 1088,
1094–95 (1991) (modeling the benefits of deterrence in relation to the severity of the
harm associated with crime).
81. See Mungan, Optimal Warning Strategies, supra note 48 (constructing a model where
the frequency and severity of the optimal sanction is increasing in the proportion of individuals who are deterrable).
82. See Miceli, Can the Twain Meet?, supra note 17, at 32 (making the same observation:
“the economic model offers no rationale for punishing offenders who are undeterrable”).
83. A legal economist may object to this statement by claiming that crimes committed
by undeterrable individuals may be efficient. I address this issue in Part IV.
84. For examples of models combining deterrence and incapacitation as incapable of
providing rationales for punishing repeat offenders more severely, see Miceli, Deterrence
and Incapacitation, supra note 17.
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model would be capable of explaining why it makes sense to punish
repeat offenders more severely than first-time offenders.
In standard economic models of crime, the combined incapacitative and deterrent benefits of punishing a repeat offender and punishing a first-time offender are roughly the same. A first-time offender, by committing a crime, reveals a high and constant propensity to
commit crime. Under this theory, committing a subsequent crime
and becoming a repeat offender reveals very little additional infor85
mation concerning the offender’s dangerousness.
This implication in the standard model is best illustrated in Professor Thomas Miceli’s recent work, which jointly analyzes deterrence
86
and incapacitation in a theoretical L&E model of law enforcement.
Miceli’s model, however, does not fully capture the informationexploiting feature of repeat offender laws. Specifically, under this
theory, a first-time offender completely reveals his dangerousness by
committing crime. Miceli makes a similar observation:
[T]he threat of imprisonment deters some offenders from
committing dangerous crimes in the first place, while those
offenders who reveal their predilection to commit crimes in
spite of the threatened punishment should be imprisoned
for life on their first apprehension in order to prevent them
87
from having further criminal opportunities.
An economic model that can provide a satisfactory explanation
as to why repeat offenders ought to be punished more severely must
be capable of incorporating the informative value of an offender’s
prior record. This cannot be achieved in standard models of crime
and deterrence, unless some of their unrealistic assumptions are re-

85. This brief analysis abstracts from the fact that more severe punishments for repeat
offenders makes the expected costs of committing subsequent crimes higher. Similarly, it
abstracts from the hypothesis that stigma costs are highest for first time offenders. See, e.g.,
Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J.L. & ECON. 519, 520–
23 (1996) (theorizing that stigma is greatest in first time offenders); Patricia Funk, On the
Effective Use of Stigma as a Crime-Deterrent, 48 EUR. ECON. REV. 715, 717 (2004) (finding that
stigma simultaneously deters unconvicted individuals from committing crimes and enhances recidivism); Alon Harel & Alon Klement, The Economics of Stigma: Why More Detection
of Crime May Result in Less Stigmatization, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 355 (2007). These opposing
effects should not affect the analysis significantly.
86. Miceli, Can the Twain Meet?, supra note 17.
87. Id. at 32 (emphasis added).
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placed with new, realistic and useful alternatives. In Part IV, I consider a candidate for such a replacement, namely the substitution of
constant criminal benefits with fluctuating criminal tendencies. Before doing so, it will be useful to describe how constant benefits are
incorporated in standard crime and deterrence models, and what
problems they cause.
III. IMPLICIT ASSUMPTION OF CONSTANT CRIMINAL TENDENCIES &
FAILURES OF L&E AS A POSITIVE THEORY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
Economic theories of law enforcement focus predominantly on
deterrence 89 because normative economic analyses of incapacitation
90
have not revealed many interesting results, and because many scholars have deemed rehabilitation, the last of “[t]he three basic measures
of crime control most frequently discussed in the criminological liter91
92
ature,” to be ineffective at reducing crime. Furthermore, the reluctance of economists to incorporate rehabilitation in normative theories of crime reflects an implicit belief that criminals’ attitudes are
hard to change through institutions, or at least that achieving such
93
changes would have “counterdeterrent” effects. This implicit belief
may have produced some spillover effects: the unwillingness of economists to consider institutionally incited changes in criminal attitudes
may have led them to overlook or ignore the possibility that criminals’
attitudes may change due to internal, and possibly even external and
random, events. This theory is consistent with the fact that an overwhelming majority of economic theories of crime invoke an implicit
or explicit assumption of constant criminal tendencies.

88. Professor Miceli seems to agree with this conclusion. He states: “[T]he current
model with fully rational offenders provides no basis at all for waiting until the third (or
even the second) offense to impose the maximal sentence. Explaining this provision of
the law therefore requires further elaboration of the basic model.” Id. The acknowledgment of fluctuating criminal tendencies can be interpreted as the “further elaboration”
referred to by Professor Miceli.
89. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
90. See supra Part II.
91. Ehrlich, supra note 19, at 311.
92. See supra Part II.A.
93. See supra note 60.
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A. Constant Criminal Tendencies Assumption
To see how the constant criminal benefits assumption is invoked
in standard crime and deterrence models, consider the simple Beckerian framework introduced in Part I.A. In this framework, potential
offenders are, by definition, people who have positive benefits (bs)
from committing crime, despite the moral cost. If a person has a nonpositive benefit, then this would immediately imply that she would be
deterred from committing crime, even with the smallest possible expected punishment (that is, b≤0<(p x s)). Whether potential offenders (that is, people with b>0) decide to commit crime depends on
whether the expected sanction (p x s) is sufficiently high.
Consider David, who is often in a position where he does not
have enough change to feed parking meters. When he has to park his
car and has no change, he would rather pay up to twenty-five dollars
94
than drive around and find change to feed the meter. In this case,
95
David’s illicit (though not criminal) benefit (b) from illegally park96
ing his car is twenty-five dollars. If, for instance, David estimates that
his probability (p) of getting a parking ticket is 1/10, and the monetary fine (s) for illegal parking is $100, then he chooses to park his car
illegally whenever he does not have enough change to feed the meter.

94. Assume that David cannot find parking meters that are out of order.
95. Illegal parking is a good example of how the simple Beckerian model works, although it is considered a civil infraction and not a crime in many jurisdictions, because: (1)
the sanction is purely monetary, (2) the monetary sanction is not high enough to trigger
the judgment-proof-offender problem and (3) counting the offender’s benefit in the social welfare calculus is less controversial than in the criminal context. See Steven Shavell, The
Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1986) (describing the judgment-proof
problem: “Parties who cause harm to others may sometimes turn out to be ‘judgment
proof,’ that is, unable to pay fully the amount for which they have been found legally liable.”); Becker, supra note 15 (including criminal benefits in the social welfare calculus).
For a criticism of this approach, see George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78
J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970). A recent working paper by economics Professors Philip A. Curry
and Matthew Doyle contributes to this debate by showing that criminal benefits may be
irrelevant, even if accounted for, in a utilitarian framework. Philip A. Curry & Matthew
Doyle,

Social

Welfare

and

the

Benefits

to

Crime

(July

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1987177.

11,

2012),

available

at

The discussion in the

proceeding parts extends the analysis to more conventional crimes.
96. For purposes of this example, it is harmless to ignore David’s legal compliance
cost; he would have had to incur the cost of feeding the meter, were he to comply.
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This follows, because his illicit benefit ($25) exceeds his expected loss
from parking illegally ((1/10) x $100 = $10).
Existing economic theories of law enforcement implicitly or explicitly assume that David’s illicit benefit from illegal parking is constant—it is always twenty-five dollars. This, coupled with the assumption that David has perfect self-control, implies that whenever David
has to choose between illegally parking and not parking, he will make
the same decision, as long as the expected sanction remains the same.
To prevent potential confusion, it should be noted that a similar constancy assumption is not invoked across individuals. As stated earlier,
potential offenders are assumed to differ from each other in their illicit benefits. Another person, Jay, may have an illicit benefit of five
dollars from illegal parking. The assumption of constant benefits refers to Jay’s and David’s unchanging benefits from illegal parking of
twenty-five dollars and five dollars, respectively.
The reliance on constant illicit benefits is best demonstrated in
the broad and expanding economic analysis of optimal punishment
of repeat offenders. Such analysis considers models in which potential offenders are assumed to have multiple opportunities to commit
an illegal act. Those who are caught multiple times committing the
offense are called repeat offenders. Economic models are used to determine conditions under which repeat offenders ought to be pun97
ished more severely than first-time offenders. Often, the assumption
98
of constant benefits is invoked implicitly by assigning the same benefits (b) to individuals across multiple opportunities. Sometimes the
assumption is invoked explicitly. The best example is Polinsky and
99
Shavell’s 1998 article on repeat offenders, which summarizes the assumption that individuals differ from each other in their illicit and
97. For a short list of articles taking this approach, see supra note 12.
98. See, e.g., Mungan, Repeat Offenders, supra note 24, at 174–76 (presenting a twoperiod crime and deterrence model, where potential offenders have two opportunities to
engage in an illegal act). As is evident from the analysis, potential offenders are assumed
to derive the same expected benefit from committing the offense in each period. This assumption of constant benefits is not explicitly stated in the article.
99. See Polinsky and Shavell, On Offense History, supra note 21. See also Miceli, Deterrence
and Incapacitation, supra note 17, at 205 (invoking the constant benefit assumption explicitly: “Assume that potential offenders have infinite life spans. At time zero, they each take a
random draw of the monetary gain from committing a crime, g, which is distributed by the
density function z(g). Each offender’s realized g will remain his “type” throughout his life
(thus, each offender will make the same choice each time he is confronted with a criminal
opportunity).”).
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constant benefits: “The magnitude of the benefit is the same in both
100
periods for a given individual but varies among individuals.”
One can imagine many reasons why the assumption of constant
101
benefits from crime is unrealistic. Jay, being a patient person, may
on average have an illicit benefit from illegal parking of five dollars.
But what if he is in a hurry? What if he is hungry, or angry? In these
situations, his benefit from illegal parking may greatly exceed five dollars. Thus, Jay’s benefits vary based on circumstances. Such variation
implies fluctuating, rather than constant, criminal tendencies.
A second source of fluctuation in criminal tendencies is related
to variations in individuals’ self-control. Even if a person’s true benefit from an illegal act remains constant, he may still commit it today
and refrain from committing it tomorrow. For instance, a person,
who is ordinarily deterred from attacking people he hates (due to expected sanctions), may temporarily lose his ability to compare costs
and benefits when he is provoked. In these cases, criminal benefits
and tendencies may diverge. Such divergences are discussed in further detail in Part IV.
In short, law enforcement models make use of the unrealistic assumption that people have constant criminal tendencies. Economists
102
always make use of simplifying assumptions, and unrealistic assumptions are expected to some extent. The real question is not whether

100. Polinsky & Shavell, On Offense History, supra note 21, at 307. The authors note that
their results would not be affected if they were to assume random benefits from crime,
showing that they have not overlooked, but assumed away, random benefits from crime,
presumably because the incorporation of random benefits does not add anything and
over-complicates their analysis. Polinsky and Shavell’s effort to assume away random benefits is harmless, mainly because the model is deterrence-based and does not formally incorporate incapacitation. In fact, the authors acknowledge that if incapacitation were considered in the model, then information on prior offenses could be used to evaluate the
propensity of an individual to commit crime. In Part V, I argue that criminal records provide relevant information about a repeat offender’s propensity to commit crime only when
people have fluctuating tendencies to commit crime.
101. See Posner, supra note 12 (describing a number of reasons why potential offenders
may have different tendencies to commit crime at different points in time related to their
emotional states).
102. See, e.g., Miceli, Deterrence and Incapacitation, supra note 17, at 205 (assuming that
“offenders are infinitely lived and potentially commit crimes throughout their lives”);
Mungan, Repeat Offenders, supra note 24, at 174 (assuming that “[s]ociety consists of individuals who are continuously distributed over benefits”).
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an unrealistic assumption was used but whether the assumption affected results that can be applied to the real world.
To demonstrate that the assumption of constant tendencies is
not only simplifying but misleading, I proceed by summarizing a
number of conclusions derived from law enforcement models that
make use of constant tendencies and that are in tension with various
legal practices. In Part V, I argue that this tension disappears when
one relaxes the assumption of constant criminal tendencies.
B. Divergences Between Normative L&E and Actual Legal Practices
103
Despite L&E’s success as a legal discipline, there are some important conflicts between the suggestions of normative L&E theories
and actual law enforcement mechanisms and practices. This suggests
that (1) some legal practices are sub-optimal, and/or (2) existing
L&E theories make use of simplifying assumptions that are misleading.
An extensive body of literature has investigated whether legal,
and in particular common law, institutions converge to efficiency over
104
time through some process of sociolegal or institutional evolution.
I do not enter this debate in this Article; instead I focus on a more
modest issue. Specifically, I investigate whether it is possible to reconcile existing legal practices with the implications of L&E models by
relaxing a simplifying assumption, namely the constancy of criminal
tendencies. As such, I focus on (2) above.
I hope to demonstrate the divergence between the implications
of L&E models and actual legal practices in three specific areas: (1)
punishment of repeat offenders, (2) treatment of remorse and apologies, and (3) punishment of voluntary manslaughter.

1. Punishment of Repeat Offenders
“In practice, the law often sanctions repeat offenders more se105
The 2011 Federal Sentencing
verely than first-time offenders.”
Guidelines, for instance, categorize offenders based on their criminal
records and call for longer sentences for criminals with longer rec-

103. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Nuno Garoupa & Carlos Gómez Ligüerre, The Evolution of the Common Law
and

Efficiency,

40

GA.

J.

INT’L

&

COMP.

L.

(forthcoming),

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1805141.
105. Polinsky & Shavell, On Offense History, supra note 21, at 305.

available

at
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106

ords.
The Clean Water Act similarly punishes repeat offenders by
doubling the maximum criminal fines and sentences for negligent vi107
State criminal statutes also
olations of various sections of the Act.
call for increased sentences for repeat offenders through three strike
108
laws.
The implications of L&E studies are not as uniform, and do not
always suggest that repeat offenders should be punished more severely. The simplest model of deterrence, for instance, suggests that detection history should be completely irrelevant for determining optimal sentences:
If the [expected] sanction for polluting and causing a
$1,000 harm is $1,000, then any person who pollutes and
pays $1,000 is a person whose gain from polluting (say the
savings from not installing pollution control equipment)
must have exceeded $1,000. Social welfare therefore is
higher as a result of his polluting. If such an individual polluted and was sanctioned in the past, that only means that it
was socially desirable for him to have polluted previously.
Raising the sanction because of his having a record of prior
109
convictions would overdeter him now.

106. The guidelines require a complicated examination of the criminal’s previous record for purposes of determining her “criminal history category.” There are six such categories, where category I is reserved for “inexperienced” criminals and category VI is for
what may be called “habitual criminals.” The appropriate sentence for a given crime is
generally longer for a criminal in category VI than a criminal in category I (unless the offense in question is level 1, 42, or 43. In these cases both categories are assigned the same
sentence: between 0–6 months for level 1, 360 months to life for level 42, and life for level
43). Sentencing Table, 2011 FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, available at http://www.ussc.
gov/Guidelines/2011_guidelines/Manual_PDF/Sentencing_Table.pdf.
107. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1).
108. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (1994); GA. CODE § 17-10-7(c) (2012); MD. CODE,
CRIM. LAW § 14-101(d)(1) (2007).
109. Polinsky & Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2, at 438. It should be
noted that this explanation as to why criminal history should not play a role in the simple
crime and deterrence model implicitly relies on the offender’s benefit being constant,
namely $1,000 in the past and in the present. It also relies on offenders’ benefits entering
into the social calculus. See supra note 95.
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This explanation, of course, is valid only under a set of simplify110
ing assumptions. Many scholars have extended the basic Beckerian
framework in various dimensions to analyze punishment schemes in
111
richer settings. Such extensions, however, have not always led to results that are consistent with actual practices. In fact, some economic
models suggest that it may be a good idea to punish first-time offend112
Other models provide raers more severely than repeat offenders.
tionales as to why it may make sense to punish repeat offenders more
113
These raseverely for purposes of achieving optimal deterrence.
tionales, however, usually rely on restrictive conditions, and the re114
sults have limited applicability.
The mixed and qualified implications of L&E studies of optimal
punishments for repeat offenders have led scholars to perceive the
115
The puzzling status of escalating punishproblem as a “puzzle.”
ments for repeat offenders in the L&E literature places it in sharp
contrast with the wide approval for punishing repeat offenders more
severely in actual practice.

110. Polinsky and Shavell also describe the various simplifying assumptions at work.
Polinsky & Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2, at 65–66 & 72 n.80.
111. See, e.g., Garoupa, Organized Crime, supra note 15, at 278 (examining organized
crime within the Beckerian framework).
112. See, e.g., Emons, supra note 24, at 254.
113. See, e.g., Mungan, Repeat Offenders, supra note 24, at 173.
114. See Thomas J. Miceli & Catherine Bucci, A Simple Theory of Increasing Penalties for
Repeat Offenders, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 71, 78 (2005) (“[T]his justification for escalating penalties, like earlier theories, seems to apply to a fairly restrictive set of circumstances—
specifically, crimes that should definitely be deterred.”); Mungan, Repeat Offenders, supra
note 24, at 173 (constructing a model where escalating punishments are optimal only if
offenders “learn how to evade the detection mechanism employed by the government”);
C.Y. Cyrus Chu et al., Punishing Repeat Offenders More Severely, 20 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127,
127, 135 (2000) (demonstrating that increasing penalties are better than uniform penalties, without comparing them to decreasing penalties); Polinsky & Shavell, On Offense History, supra note 21, at 66–67 (constructing a model based on less restrictive assumptions,
but providing a rationale for slightly different sanction schemes than escalating punishment schemes for repeat offenders).
115. See, e.g., David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders, 110 YALE L.J. 733, 737 (2001) (stating that “the phenomenon of escalating penalties
based on offense history presents an even greater puzzle from an economic perspective
than has been previously recognized”); Emons, supra note 12, at 254 (referring to the punishment of repeat offenders more severely as a puzzle).
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2. Remorse and Apologies
Remorse can be a mitigating factor in determining a criminal’s
punishment. 116 Although the instances in which the Federal Sentencing Guidelines call for a reduction in sentences due to manifestations
117
of remorse are very limited, a number of states may “permit the use
118
of remorse as a mitigating factor.” Perhaps more importantly, manifestations of remorse, such as apologies, can affect the way judges ex119
ercise discretion in sentencing criminals. In fact, a number of previous studies discuss how judges are tempted to impose shorter
120
sentences when they are convinced that an offender is remorseful.

116. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.16 (2011).
117. See id. (“[D]ownward departure under this section might be considered where a
defendant, motivated by remorse, discloses an offense that otherwise would have remained
undiscovered.”). But such sentence reductions are more closely related to the “voluntary
disclosure of offense” than the manifestation of remorse. As such, these sentence reductions are completely consistent with the suggestions of economic studies of law enforcement, which advocate a reduction in penalty for self-reporters. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior, 102 J. POL. ECON. 583,
603 (1994) (finding that “increasing incentives for reporting harmful acts would induce
more reporting and raise welfare”). This makes sense from a purely economic perspective
because by self-reporting a person increases his probability of being caught from some
smaller probability to one, which reduces the necessity of imposing costly sanctions to deter the criminal. This does not necessarily imply, however, that apologies should lead to
sentence reductions. See Mungan, Apologies, supra note 24, at 179 n.5 (arguing that selfreporting and apologies can be unbundled).
118. Paul H. Robinson et al., Extralegal Punishment Factors: A Study of Forgiveness, Hardship, Good-Deeds, Apology, Remorse, and Other Such Discretionary Factors in Assessing Criminal
Punishment, in SCHOLARSHIP AT PENN LAW, March 29, 2011, at 7, available at
http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn_wps/362 (citing State v. Trostle, 951 P.2d 869, 887 (Ariz.
1997); Jackson v. State, 684 So. 2d 1213, 1238 (Miss. 1996); State v. Allen, 994 P.2d 728,
764 (N.M. 2000); Pope v. State, 441 So. 2d 1073, 1078 (Fla. 1983); FLA. STAT.
§ 921.0026(2)(j) (2012)).
119. Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into
Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 99 (2004).
120. See, e.g., id. (“[J]udges heed expressions of remorse and apology and weigh them
heavily at sentencing.”); STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE
SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 115 (1988) (reviewing empirical research and
finding that “it is important for many judges that defendants recognize the gravity of their
offense, accept the blame for their misdeeds, and express remorse or contrition for
them”).
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Consequentialist approaches studying the proper role of remorse
and its manifestations in the criminal justice system, however, suggest
121
Under simple
that they should not be used as mitigating factors.
consequentialist analyses focusing exclusively on deterrence, this follows because remorse is by definition an ex post concept, and there122
fore it should be irrelevant for deterring criminals ex ante. In addi123
tion, apologies are viewed as mere “cheap talk” making them “non124
125
informative of an individual’s conscious state” and non-credible.
Furthermore, the prospect of reducing a sentence for apologizing de126
creases deterrence. Finally, a system in which convincing apologies
lead to reduced penalties generates asymmetric incentives for potential offenders because of the difficulty in “sort[ing] out the truly re127
morseful defendant from the unrepentant but savvy defendant.” As
demonstrated by a number of articles, asymmetric incentives can lead
128
to costs associated with under- as well as over-deterrence.
In short, there is a divergence between the way remorse and
apologies are treated in the criminal justice system, and the way they
ought to be treated according to simple but meticulous consequentialist analyses of manifestations of remorse.
3. Voluntary Manslaughter
129

Voluntary manslaughter is punished less severely than murder.
From a simple deterrence-based L&E perspective, such reductions
appear to be problematic. Unless the degree of control one can exert
fluctuates over time and circumstances, it is hard to understand why
the law reduces the punishment for killing when committed in the
“heat of passion,” without sufficient “cooling time” and produced by
121. See supra note 24.
122. Mungan, Apologies, supra note 24, at 181.
123. Robert H. Frank, Departures from Rational Choice: With and Without Regret, in THE
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 25 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith
eds., 2005).
124. See Mungan, Apologies, supra note 24, at 178.
125. Ward, supra note 24, at 132.
126. See Mungan, Apologies, supra note 24, at 178 (“Imposing lower sanctions on those
who convincingly display remorse will therefore have an effect of lowering the expected
punishment.”).
127. Ward, supra note 24, at 164.
128. See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 75, at 446–47; Mungan, supra note 75, at 249.
129. See supra note 23.
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130

an “adequate provocation.”
It is, therefore, not surprising that the
deterrence-based justification for such reductions, offered by Eric
131
Posner, relies on a variant of fluctuating criminal tendencies.
The consequentialist rationale identified by Posner for punishing
voluntary manslaughter less severely than murder focuses on the fact
that voluntary manslaughter is generally hard—and sometimes impos132
sible—to deter. As such, reductions in punishment are justified because “expensive sanctions should not be wasted on people who can133
This reasoning relies on the fact that
not be deterred by them.”
people experience intense anger under extraordinary circumstances
and, under the stimulus of such emotions, are very unresponsive to
134
punishment and therefore hard to deter. Accordingly, Posner’s rationale relies on people being less able to exert control over their actions when they find themselves in extraordinary circumstances,
135
which violates the constant benefit assumption discussed earlier.
Although Posner’s rationale is very appealing, it has a caveat that
can be exploited by scholars who disfavor consequentialist approaches. A criticism of Posner’s claim can be formulated in a few steps.
First, since courts cannot perfectly identify whether people were undeterrable at the time they committed crime, they must rely on blunt
proxies to decide whether a killing should be classified as voluntary
136
Second, since such blunt proxies are overinclusive,
manslaughter.
they classify some killings committed by deterrable individuals as voluntary manslaughter. Therefore, sanction reductions for voluntary
manslaughter may lower deterrence for individuals who are indeed
137
Furthermore, individuals who are less responsive to
deterrable.

130. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 305 (summarizing what constitutes voluntary manslaughter).
131. Posner, supra note 12, at 1978. The concept of fluctuating criminal tendencies is
explained further in Part IV.
132. Id. at 1993–95.
133. Id. at 1994.
134. Id. at 1995.
135. See supra Part III.A.
136. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 305 (observing that “[h]omicide law typically grades a certain class of emotional killings as voluntary manslaughter rather than
murder”).
137. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 310 (“But how can a consequentialist be
sure that the savings from relaxing one offender’s punishment on this ground will not be
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punishment, but not completely undeterrable, may require penalty
138
enhancements to be deterred from committing crime.
Posner’s argument can be strengthened in a framework that incorporates the incapacitation function of punishment as well as fluc139
tuating criminal tendencies.
C. Constant Criminal Tendencies and Their Role in the Divergences
Between Normative L&E and Actual Legal Practices
So far, I have demonstrated that there is a divergence between
what simple law enforcement models suggest the law ought to be, and
140
how the law actually manifests itself. Simple law enforcement models rely on the assumption that criminals have constant criminal
141
tendencies, which may be responsible for the divergences between
normative L&E and actual legal practices. But is it?
Section V demonstrates that the implications of economic models capable of producing fluctuating criminal tendencies are more
consistent with actual legal practices and intuitions. It should be noted that a simple departure from constant criminal tendencies is, in
142
In addition to inmost cases, insufficient to achieve these results.
corporating fluctuating criminal tendencies, it is also necessary to
move from a simple deterrence-based framework to one that incorporates the deterrence and incapacitation functions of criminal justice
143
systems. As such, fluctuating criminal tendencies, as defined in Part
IV, are necessary—but not sufficient—to provide economic justifications for the practices summarized in Part III.

offset by the deterrence-undermining effects of such a disposition on the behavior of others who find themselves in such situations for the first time?”).
138. See, e.g., Moin A. Yahya, Deterring Roper’s Juveniles: Using a Law and Economics Approach to Show That the Logic of Roper Implies That Juveniles Require the Death Penalty More
Than Adults, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 53, 65 (2006) (arguing that severe penalties, such as the
death penalty, are required and justified to deter juveniles, who may be harder to deter
than adults).
139. See supra Part V.
140. See supra Part III.B.
141. See supra Part I.D.
142. See notes 136–138 and accompanying text.
143. See supra Part II.D.
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IV. INTEGRATING FLUCTUATING CRIMINAL TENDENCIES INTO THE
ECONOMIC THEORY OF CRIME
People may have fluctuating, rather than constant, criminal
tendencies for two reasons. First, people may have different benefits
from the same illegal activity at different points in time. Second,
people may possess different degrees of self-control at different points
in time.
This Part, for pedagogical reasons, begins by focusing on the first
factor, and formalizes how fluctuating criminal tendencies can be in144
Then, in Part IV.C, I draw
corporated into standard L&E models.
on insights from the behavioral L&E literature to incorporate the second factor, namely that people may lack perfect self-control.
A. Incorporating Fluctuating Tendencies
Standard crime and deterrence models assume that a person’s
tendency to commit crime is defined through his constant benefits
145
Using the previously introduced framework, a person
from crime.
commits a crime if his constant benefit (b) exceeds the expected pun146
ishment from the crime (p x s). This framework can be altered easily to incorporate fluctuating criminal tendencies: instead of assuming
147
that b is constant, one can assume that it is a random variable.

144. See infra Parts IV.A, B.
145. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 176 (1968) (observing that “[s]ome persons become ‘criminals,’ therefore, not because their basic motivation differs from that of other persons, but because their benefits
and costs differ”).
146. See supra Part I.A.
147. A random variable describes the outcome generated through a stochastic or random process. “Consider an experiment in which a person is selected at random from
some population and her height in inches is measured. This height is a random variable.”
PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 98 (Morris H. DeGroot & Mark J. Schervish eds., 2002). By
using mathematics, a more precise definition can be provided:
Consider an experiment for which the sample space is denoted by S [i.e.
Pr(S)=1, where Pr(X) denotes the probability of X occurring]. A real-valued
function that is defined on the space S is called a random variable. In other
words, in a particular experiment a random variable X would be some function
that assigns a real number X(s) to each possible outcome s∈S.
Id. at 97. Part IV discusses how fluctuating criminal tendencies can be modeled by making
use of random variables.
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Random variables take on values through stochastic processes.
To be more specific, consider the previous example involving Jay and
illegal parking. Jay may have a certain tendency to park illegally under normal circumstances, but this tendency may be greater when he
is impatient or in a hurry. The instant purpose is not to elaborate on
148
specific conditions that may change Jay’s illicit benefits, but to identify a simple way to incorporate his fluctuating criminal tendencies in
standard economic theories of crime, namely by converting b into a
random variable.
To exemplify how random variables can be included in standard
economic theories of crime, let us begin by making the extreme assumption that Jay only has three psychological states: calm, impatient,
and frustrated. Let us also assume that his benefits in these three states
are $5, $20, and $30, respectively. Assume further that half of the
time Jay is calm, a quarter of the time he is impatient, and the other
quarter of the time he is frustrated. In this case, Jay’s fluctuating illicit
149
benefits can be represented by the probability function depicted in
Figure 1.

148. See Posner, supra note 12, at 1981–82 (providing a detailed discussion as to why
individuals’ criminal tendencies may fluctuate).
149. For probability functions, see DeGroot et al., supra note 147, at 99. Here, Jay’s
benefit from illegal parking can take on a finite number of values, namely three. To reflect this fact an economist would say that Jay’s benefit from illegal parking is a discrete random variable. More precisely and generally “[i]t is said that a random variable X has a discrete distribution or that X is a discrete random variable if X can take only a finite number k of
different values x1, . . . ,xk or, at most an infinite sequence of different values x1, x2, . . . .”
Id. To describe probabilities with which a discrete random variable takes on specific values, we use probability functions (“PF”). It follows that “the probability function . . . of X is
defined as the function f such that for every real number x, f(x)=Pr(X=x).” Id. Using this
notation the PF describing Jay’s illicit benefits can be expressed as:
0.5 if x=5
f(x)= 0.25 if x=20
0.25 if x=30
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Figure 1 compares the expected fine from illegal parking ($10)
with Jay’s illicit benefits when he is calm ($5), impatient ($20), and
frustrated ($30). Since Jay’s illicit benefits exceed the expected fine
from illegal parking when he is either impatient or frustrated, and
since he is impatient or frustrated half of the time, Jay will decide to
park illegally half of the time when he does not have sufficient change
to feed the meter. This frequency, through no coincidence, corresponds to the probability obtained by summing the heights of the
boxes to the right of the expected fine (that is, $10) in Figure 1:
¼+¼=½.
It is plausible to assume, of course, that in reality people do not
have three potential psychological states but many, perhaps an infi150
To incorporate this assumption, we can allow b to
nite number.
take on an infinite number of values. Furthermore, for expositional
151
purposes, we may assume that b is distributed around a certain value
most of the time and that it rarely deviates from that value significantly. Specifically, we may assume that Jay’s benefits from illegal parking
152
vary between $0 and $30, and that most of the time his benefits are
150. As Posner also observes, people may experience emotions with different intensities
(for example, one may be very angry, angry, slightly angry, not angry at all, etc.). See Posner, supra note 12, at 1980.
151. The exact distribution obviously depends on the person and the illegal activity in
question. The purpose here is to give an example of how b can potentially be distributed.
The arguments in the next Part do not rely on these specific assumptions. See infra Part
IV.B.
152. It is implicitly assumed that Jay’s benefits can take on any real number between 0
and 30. If benefits are assumed to take on values corresponding to whole dollars, for in-
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between $4 and $6. In this case Jay’s probability density function
153
(“PDF”) over illegal parking can be represented by the following
graph.

When a PDF is used, as in Figure 2, to represent Jay’s fluctuating
tendency to park illegally, the probability with which Jay’s illegal benefit exceeds the expected fine can no longer be measured by focusing
on the height of the boxes representing probabilities, as in the discrete
154
distribution case represented by Figure 1. Instead, we must focus on
the area that lies below the PDF and to the right of $10. The size of
this area, that is, Area A in Figure 2, represents the probability with
which Jay’s illegal benefit exceeds the expected fine of $10. It should
also be noted that since Jay’s benefit from illegal parking is assumed
to always lie between $0 and $30, the entire area below the PDF in
Figure 2 (shaded in gray) corresponds to a probability of one.

stance, then his benefits can take on only thirty-one different values, that is, $0, $1, $2, . . .
$28, $29, $30), in which case a PF, as in Figure 1, would better represent Jay’s fluctuating
benefits from illegal parking.
153. Since Jay’s benefit “can assume every value in an interval” it has a “continuous distribution.” DeGroot et al., supra note 147, at 103. More generally, “[i]t is said that a random variable X has a continuous distribution or that X is a continuous random variable if there
exists a nonnegative function f, defined on the real line, such that for every subset A of the
real line, the probability that X takes a value in A is the integral of f over the set A.” Id. For
instance, if A=(4,6], then
Pr(4 < 𝑥 ≤ 6)

“The function f is called the probability density function . . . of X.” Id.
154. See supra note 149.
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B. Multiple Potential Offenders with Fluctuating Tendencies
So far, we have focused on the potential illicit benefits of a single
person (namely Jay). But, as stated in Part III, different individuals
may have different tendencies to commit crime, or, in our example,
park illegally. These differences in tendencies can be represented by
making use of multiple PDFs, one for each individual in society.
Consider, for instance, David, a person who is more likely than
Jay to park illegally, because he is, on average, less patient (or values
his time more). David’s tendency to park illegally can be captured by
a PDF that assigns high probabilities to greater benefits from parking
illegally. Figure 3 demonstrates how different PDFs can be used to
represent individuals with different tendencies to park illegally.

As can be inferred from Figure 3, David is more likely to park illegally than Jay, because his benefit from illegal parking is more likely
to exceed the expected fine of $10. Specifically, Area D (the dotted
area) is greater than Area J (the semi-transparent gray area) in Figure
3, which respectively represent the probabilities with which David and
Jay will have benefits from illegal parking exceeding $10.
These examples focus on illegal parking, because it is an “offense” that many people have committed, perhaps multiple times. As
such, most people can relate to the idea of having fluctuating benefits
or tendencies by reflecting on their own experiences with illegal parking.
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C. Insights from Behavioral Economics and Divergences Between
Criminal Tendencies and Benefits
Previously, when referring to illegal parking, I characterized the
offender’s fluctuating tendency to park illegally as a direct result of
fluctuations in his actual benefits from parking. 155 This was mainly for
pedagogical reasons, and to introduce fluctuating tendencies in an
easily comprehensible way. It is not hard to imagine that people may
temporarily act in ways that do not serve their best interests. In such
cases, criminal tendencies and benefits diverge.
When it comes to battery, for example, many people presumably
have criminal benefits distributed around zero. Yet there are exceptional cases where the same people have significantly high criminal
tendencies: a person who is hungry and hypoglycemic may be tempt156
ed to attack a person who she finds irritating; a fanatic soccer team
supporter may temporarily find it in his best interest to attack a per157
son insulting his team; a person who comes home and finds his wife
in bed with another person may lose control and attack that person or
158
his wife.

155. See supra Part IV.A.
156. See, e.g., Winchell v. Guy, 857 N.E.2d 1024, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (describing a
fight that broke out in a drive thru lane of a Taco Bell because a hungry woman yelled at
the driver in front of her for taking too long while placing his order). Of course, this particular justification has also been used in the reverse. See Eileen A. Scallen & William E.
Wiethoff, The Ethos of Expert Witnesses: Confusing the Admissibility, Sufficiency and Credibility of
Expert Testimony, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1143, 1161 (1998) (describing the “Twinky defense,”
where accused murderer Dan White attributed his killing the San Francisco Mayor George
Moscone and Harvey Milk to eating a large amount of sugary pastries).
157. See Lindsay M. Korey Lefteroff, Excessive Heckling and Violent Behavior at Sporting
Events: A Legal Solution?, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 119, 134–35 (2005) (“Some [soccer]
venues have even installed moats around the soccer pitch to distance unruly fans from
game officials and players, who are often the primary targets of the fans’ fury.”).
158. For an example, see Lynn Hecht Schafran, There’s No Accounting for Judges, 58 ALB.
L. REV. 1063 (1995). She relays this story:
On February 8, 1994, a Maryland trucker named Kenneth Peacock came home
unexpectedly during a winter storm and found his wife in bed with another man.
For several hours Peacock argued with his wife while drinking wine and beer.
Then he shot her in the head with a hunting rifle. Peacock plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter.
Id. at 1063 (footnote omitted).
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These observations reveal the fact that people have fluctuating
criminal tendencies. How one interprets criminal tendencies vis-à-vis
criminal benefits, however, may have important implications concerning the desirability of various punishment schemes from a consequen159
tialist perspective, even if under a limited set of circumstances.
In particular, if one includes criminal benefits in the social wel160
fare calculus, then one cannot immediately rule out the possibility
that individuals with high tendencies to commit crime are committing
161
Specifically, if the expected punishment for a crime
efficient crimes.
is set at a significantly high level and a person is still not deterred
from committing that crime, one may incorrectly conclude that the
162
crime must have been efficient. Because I invoke assumptions that
contradict this conclusion, I first explain why it is incorrect.
159. The interpretation is irrelevant if criminal benefits are not included in the social
welfare calculus. See supra note 95. This follows trivially, because what matters is not
whether and how much the criminal benefits from his actions, but simply his likelihood or
tendency to commit crime. Moreover, even if criminal benefits are included in the social
welfare calculus, the distinction is unimportant in cases where the harm associated with
the crime is not exceeded by any potential offender’s benefit from crime. In this case,
there are always benefits from deterrence as well as incapacitation, which is the main observation that I rely on in conducting the analysis in Part V. The only case where the absence of divergences between benefits and tendencies may have a substantial effect on the
analysis is when criminal benefits are included in the social welfare calculus and there are
criminals whose benefits exceed the harm inflicted through crime. In this particular case,
interpreting tendencies as occasionally diverging from benefits supports my analysis. This
is the case analyzed in the proceeding paragraphs.
160. See supra note 95.
161. A crime is defined to be efficient if the social harm from the crime is exceeded by
the criminal benefits enjoyed by the criminal. See Becker, supra note 145, at 180–82 (explaining efficient crimes). With crimes leading to monetary losses, it is easy to see how a
crime can be efficient. If the only loss—all direct and indirect costs included—created by
the crime is worth $100, and if the criminal is willing to pay $101 to commit that crime, the
crime is efficient. For other, more serious offenses, such as murder, the harm inflicted
through crime is extreme, and it may be plausible to assume that no criminal benefit can
exceed the harm inflicted through murder. But this Article does not make this assumption because it does not appear to be necessary. Instead, I am making the weaker assumption that—at any relevant punishment level—serious crimes committed by offenders are,
on average, inefficient. I support and explain this assumption in further detail in the proceeding paragraphs.
162. This is a commonly invoked argument in the law enforcement literature. Its simplest form can be stated more discretely as follows: If h is the harm from crime, p is the
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There are at least three reasons as to why the commission of a
crime, despite very high penalties, does not imply that the criminal
possesses benefits that exceed the harm inflicted through crime.
First, some criminals, even if they are completely rational, are nondeterrable. Some criminals simply do not view imprisonment as a signif163
The fact that such a person commits crime deicant punishment.
spite an expected sentence of 100 years does not imply that the crime
164
committed by this person is efficient.
The two remaining reasons come from behavioral economics,
which studies how people systematically deviate from common assumptions invoked in standard economic analyses and how “human
165
beings make systematic mistakes in their decision making.” Systemat166
167
ic mistakes occurring due to cognitive biases and bounded willpower
appear to account for departures from the deterrability and common
knowledge assumptions discussed in Parts I.B. and I.C., respectively,

probability, and s the severity of punishment, then setting s=h/p implies that a risk-neutral
potential offender will commit crime, if and only if, his benefit exceeds the harm from
crime, which makes the crime efficient. But see infra note 164 (showing why this argument
does not generalize to cases where sanctions have differential deterrent effects on people).
163. Consider, for instance, the case of Earl Albert Moore, an attempted bombing suspect, who, according to his former son-in-law “did what he did because he wanted to go
back to prison.” Jeffrey Wolf & Will Ripley, Relative: Southwest Plaza Mall Bomb Suspect
‘Wanted to Go Back to Prison,’ 9NEWS.COM (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.9news.com/news/
story.aspx?storyid=195506&catid=222; see also Jazmine Ulloa, Convict Couldn’t Handle Being
Free, MYSA (Sept. 25, 2011), http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_news/article/
Convictcouldn-thandlebeing-free-2187648.php (“Most inmates want out of the pen. Randall Lee Church burned a house down to get back inside.”); Andrew Marra, Man Charged
in Robbery of West Palm Beach Bank of America Branch, PALM BEACH POST (Dec. 29, 2010),
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/crime/man-charged-in-robbery-of-west-palmbeach-1152346.html (explaining that “Charles Latham, 47, robbed the Bank of America in
downtown West Palm Beach because he wanted to go back to prison”).
164. In symbols, if p denotes the probability of conviction, h is the harm from crime,
and ci(s) denotes the cost incurred by person i from being convicted for s years, then pci(s)
<h can be true for all s and for some i. Therefore, there will be individuals with benefit b
such that, pci(s) <b<h, who commit, by definition, inefficient crimes.
165. McAdams & Ulen, supra note 50, at 406.
166. See, e.g., id. at 417–21 (discussing cognitive biases in further detail).
167. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1479 (1998) (discussing bounded willpower in
further detail).
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and thereby supply explanations for why people may commit inefficient crimes even when expected sanctions are very high.
Specifically, it is well documented that many people have cogni168
This
tive biases leading them to be overconfident and optimistic.
insight, when applied to criminal law enforcement, suggests that criminals will tend to overcommit crimes, that is, they will commit crimes in
cases where the expected utility from committing crime exceeds their
169
Finally,
expected utility from refraining from committing crime.
people may possess bounded willpower, which refers to the inability of a
person to act in a manner that serves his long term benefits, even
when he is perfectly informed about the costs and benefits associated
170
with his actions. Criminals with bounded willpower will also tend to
overcommit crimes, since the presence of immediate criminal benefits,
rather than delayed expected penalties, will guide their decisions to
171
commit crimes.
The existence of cognitive biases suggest that people may commit
inefficient crimes, even when there are very high expected penalties,
and that some criminals do not view imprisonment as a particularly
harsh punishment. As such, crimes will occur at any given level of
punishment, even when the social cost exceeds the criminal benefits
of such crimes. In the remainder of this Article, I will assume that—at
all relevant punishment levels—the proportion of inefficient crimes is
relatively high, such that there are expected benefits from deterring

168. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, On Law Enforcement with Boundedly Rational Actors, in THE
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 273 (Francesco Parisi and Vernon Smith
eds., 2004) (“[A] highly robust feature of human behavior is that people underestimate
the probability that negative events will happen to them as opposed to others”); see also
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1091–93 (2000) (discussing issues
related to overconfidence and optimism biases); McAdams & Ulen, supra note 50; Neil D.
Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
806 (1980); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health Problems:
Conclusions from a Community-Wide Sample, 10 J. BEHAV. MED. 481 (1987).
169. A similar point is made by Korobkin and Ulen, supra note 168, at 1092.
170. This point was made by Professor Robert Cooter long before the recent literature
on behavioral L&E emerged. See Cooter, supra note 12.
171. This problem is commonly called dynamic inconsistency and is theorized by making use of hyperbolic discounting. See, e.g., Manuel A. Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals and Repeated Time-Inconsistent Misconduct, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 612 (2007).
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crimes and from incapacitating individuals with a likelihood of recidi172
vating.
Having introduced the reasons why people may possess fluctuating criminal tendencies and how their tendencies do not necessarily
reflect their criminal benefits, I now consider individuals who almost
never need to be deterred because they find it morally wrong to
commit crimes. Such individuals have low tendencies to commit
173
crime, but, even if rarely, may “lapse” into committing crime.
D. Law Abiding Citizens, Fluctuating Criminal Tendencies, and NonDeterrable Crimes
Consider Michael, a person who under normal circumstances
cannot even imagine murdering someone. Ordinarily he would not
kill, even if it were legal. But, if he ever finds his wife in bed with another man, he would temporarily be overcome by the temptation of
174
attacking that person (or his wife ) regardless of the penalty associated with murder (or manslaughter), and this attack may result in the
175
death of that person. If, however, Michael has sufficient cooling time,
he would realize that attacking either individual would be a mistake
and decide not to commit a crime. When Michael acts under the influence of temporary and emotional stimuli, he acts against his best
interest.
For purposes of sketching out Michael’s fluctuating criminal
tendencies, which may diverge from his benefits, it is sufficient to
note that Michael may temporarily be undeterrable in cases where he
is under the influence of emotional stimuli. Furthermore, even if very
rarely, Michael gets so angry at people that, but for the prospect of
imprisonment, he would consider killing them. In this case, the PDF

172. This is a weaker assumption than the assumption that the harm from crime always
exceeds the benefit from crime, which has previously been invoked in economic analyses
of law enforcement. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for
Acts that Definitely are Undesirable, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1992).
173. The term lapsing is used by Cooter, supra note 12, to refer to situations where individuals commit crime. Professor Cooter defines lapses as the “rare occasions when [the
potential offender] draws preferences from the tail of the distribution where uncertain or
future costs are discounted very highly.” Id. at 150.
174. See supra note 158.
175. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 305 (discussing the concept of cooling time
and a number of cases interpreting it).

204

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:156

representing Michael’s tendency to commit crime can be represented
176
by Figure 4 below.
As Figure 4 demonstrates, there is little deterrence value to punishing Michael, because (1) most of the time (as in Zone 1) punishment is unnecessary; Michael abstains from crime even if there is no
punishment, (2) in the unlikely event that Michael has a desire to
commit crime, it is more likely than not that there is no punishment
available that can deter him (as in Zone 3). Furthermore, in the rare
case when Michael has a desire to commit crime and can be deterred
from doing so (as in Zone 2), relatively small expected punishments
are usually sufficient for deterrence purposes. Thus, from a deterrence perspective, if each individual in society were like Michael, it
176. For expositional purposes, Figure 4 is drawn such that it assigns positive densities
for values smaller than “0 years” as well as for values greater than “100 years.” The choice
of ‘100’ years is completely arbitrary. One may object to this exposition, suggesting that
such values cannot exist or are meaningless. The purpose here is to represent by Zone 1
the frequency with which Michael has no desire to commit crime and by Zone 3 the frequency with which Michael is nondeterrable. This exposition enables such representation
in a comprehensible and compact manner. An alternative way of representing the same
idea would be to assign positive probabilities to points “0 years” and “100 years.” But this
would require the use of mixed distributions, which would be more difficult to represent and
explain. See DeGroot et al., supra note 147, at 108 (explaining mixed distributions). Furthermore, with some creativity, values smaller than “0 years” could be interpreted as cases
corresponding to subsidized crimes (for example, the government rewards rather than
punishing crime) and values greater than “100 years” can be interpreted as being tortured
at varying degrees of severity while in jail.
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would be desirable to either not punish the killing of other people, or
to impose relatively small punishments.
Scholars have criticized L&E theories of punishment by making
177
similar points; if most crimes are committed by people who are undeterrable, how can we explain the fact that we punish them by using
an L&E theory? I answer this and related questions in the next Part.
V. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS WITH FLUCTUATING CRIMINAL TENDENCIES
There are at least two interrelated potential reasons why, from a
consequentialist perspective, criminals ought to be punished, even if
most criminals are frequently nondeterrable. First, imprisoning nondeterrable criminals incapacitates them and prevents them from
178
Accordingly, if the harm 179 associated
committing further crime.
with the crime prevented through incapacitation exceeds the cost of
imprisonment, punishing nondeterrable criminals through impris180
Second, even if
onment is justifiable on consequentialist grounds.
some potential criminals are frequently nondeterrable, punishment
could still, even if infrequently, lead them to abstain from committing
181
crime and deter other potential criminals who are more responsive
to punishment. Therefore, if benefits associated with the deterrence
of such a minority exceeds the cost of punishing nondeterrable criminals, then punishment would again be justifiable on consequentialist
grounds.
The first consequentialist (and incapacitation-based) justification
for punishment exists only if the criminal being punished has a signif182
icant likelihood of committing crime in the future. If every individ183
ual were like Michael, we would not expect to see a high frequency
of recidivism; therefore, benefits from incapacitation would be offset
177. See supra note 3.
178. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. But see Ehrlich, supra note 19, at 315
(mentioning a caveat “although imprisonment temporarily eliminates participation in
criminal activity outside of prison walls, it does not stop it inside”).
179. If criminal benefits are included in the social welfare calculus, then social harm
equals the harm to the victim minus the benefit to the criminal. See supra Part II.
180. See infra Part V.A.
181. For example, Michael, whose criminal tendencies are depicted in Figure 4, is deterred from committing crime when his criminal tendencies fall in Zone 2 in Figure 4.
182. See Shavell, Optimal Incapacitation, supra note 17 (demonstrating that incapacitative
benefits increase with the offender’s dangerousness, that is, his likelihood of recidivating).
183. See supra Figure 4 (summarizing Michael’s criminal tendencies).
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184

by costs of imprisonment.
Similarly, we would not expect benefits
associated with deterrence to be high, because punishment rarely de185
Both justifications rely on there being at
ters people like Michael.
least some individuals who do not have criminal tendencies similar to
Michael’s.
Having established that the presence of individuals, who are different than Michael, is a necessary condition for the proffered consequentialist justifications for punishment in general, we must ask
whether they are also sufficient for providing rationales for the “puzzling” practices in criminal law discussed in Part III. In the remainder
of this Part, I demonstrate that if there are some individuals who have
186
high criminal tendencies and are more responsive to punishment—
along with people like Michael—then many “puzzling” doctrines and
legal practices can be justified on consequentialist grounds. I also
demonstrate the key role that fluctuating criminal tendencies play in
these justifications.
Briefly stated, when there are professional criminals (individuals
with fluctuating and high criminal tendencies), as well as nonprofessional criminals (individuals like Michael), existing practices in
criminal law can be interpreted as mechanisms that address the tradeoff between minimizing the unnecessary costs of punishing nonprofessional criminals and maximizing the deterrence and incapacitation of professional criminals.
A. Punishing Repeat Offenders More Severely
When people possess constant criminal tendencies, it is hard to
provide a consequentialist and satisfying justification as to why repeat
offenders should be punished more severely. When we assume that
people have fluctuating criminal tendencies, then punishing repeat

184. See Shavell, Optimal Incapacitation, supra note 17 (explaining that higher levels of
punishment, like incapacitation, are ineffective in situations where there are only rare instances of potentially criminal behavior).
185. This follows from the fact that Zone 2, in Figure 4, occupies a very small area in
comparison to Zones 1 and 3.
186. The existence of individuals with high criminal tendencies is supported by arrest
data offered by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. In particular, the data suggest that over two
thirds of prisoners released in 1994 were rearrested within three years after their release.
Patrick A. Langan & David J. Levin, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, 15 FED.
SENTENCING REP. 58, 58 (2002).
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offenders more severely serves a consequentialist purpose related to
187
its information-exploiting feature.
When a person is caught committing crime for the first time, it is
not clear whether he did it because he is a professional criminal, or
because he is a nonprofessional criminal who happened to have an
188
unexpected impulse which led him to lose control over his actions.
If the first time offender committed a crime due to the latter explanation, then it makes little sense to punish him severely. As explained
earlier, nonprofessional criminals are unlikely to recidivate, and se189
vere sanctions are rarely necessary or incapable of deterring them.
In this case, incapacitation and deterrence rationales for punishment
do not exist, or are very weak. If, on the other hand, the first-time offender is a professional criminal, then he should be punished severely
because punishment results in significant incapacitation as well as deterrence benefits.
For purposes of sentencing, however, it is not possible to distinguish between first-time offenders who are professional and nonprofessional criminals, because criminal tendencies are not directly ob190
Accordingly, both types must be punished uniformly.
servable.
This creates a simple trade-off: reducing costs of punishing nonprofessional criminals and increasing the deterrence and incapacitation
191
of professional criminals. The greater the proportion of nonprofes-

187. An interesting question to consider is to what extent the rationales provided in
this Section extend to corporate crimes and liabilities. Since individuals who have control
over corporations change over time, updating Bayesian beliefs, as described in note 193,
concerning the dangerousness of corporations may often be difficult or meaningless. In
cases where such updating is impossible the rationale for punishing offenders discussed in
this Section vanishes for corporations, but not individuals. For a discussion of optimal
punishment of corporations versus individuals, see Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D.
Wright, Antitrust Sanctions, in 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 3 (2010); Jennifer Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
CRIMINAL LAW (Alon Harel & Keith Hylton, eds., forthcoming 2012).
188. This would correspond to the case where a person has criminal tendencies similar
to those depicted in Figure 4, and due to some rare event temporarily falls in Zone 3 and
is undeterrable.
189. They are unlikely to recidivate, because ex ante, their likelihood of falling in
Zones 2 and 3, as in Figure 4, is very small. They are rarely deterred by severe sanctions
because Zone 2, in Figure 4, occupies a very small area in comparison to Zones 1 and 3.
190. See supra Part IV.D.
191. See supra Part II.D.
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sional offenders in society, the more important it becomes to reduce
192
the costs of punishing these offenders, and vice versa. This observation is key to explaining why, from a consequentialist perspective, repeat offenders ought to be punished more severely.
Just as it is impossible to determine with certainty whether a firsttime offender is a nonprofessional or a professional criminal, it is impossible to determine the same for a repeat offender. The fact that a
person is a repeat offender, however, does provide some valuable information for sentencing purposes: a repeat offender is much less
likely to be a nonprofessional criminal than a professional criminal.
This follows from a simple application of Bayesian updating of be193
liefs. Given that a person has committed crime twice, it is likely that
this person is professional criminal and has a PDF that assigns high
benefits from crime. As a result, the proportion of repeat offenders
who are nonprofessional criminals should be much lower than the
proportion of first-time offenders who are nonprofessional criminals.
As explained earlier, there is a trade-off between minimizing the
costs of punishing nonprofessional criminals and deterring and incapacitating professional criminals. This trade-off necessitates the im-

192. This observation may be capable of providing a novel explanation as to why penalties for similar offenses are higher in the United States than in other countries. More
generally, if the proportion of nonprofessional criminals is decreasing with inequality,
then we should see higher sentences for similar offenses in countries with higher inequality. As such, this brief observation may provide a starting point for future research projects.
193. Bayesian updating of beliefs occurs when the discovery of a piece of information
affects the estimated likelihood of an event taking place. The concept is closely related to
the calculation of conditional probabilities and Bayes’s Theorem. See, e.g., DeGroot et al.,
supra note 147, at 49–79. The likelihood that one believes a certain event will occur, prior
to the discovery of new information, is called the prior probability of that event happening.
Similarly, the likelihood that one believes a certain event will occur, after the discovery of
new information, is called the posterior probability of that event happening. The posterior
probability that a repeat offender, named Y, is a professional criminal (PC), can be calculated by using Bayes’s Theorem.
Pr(Y is PC|Y committed 2nd crime) =
Pr(Y is PC)Pr(Y committed 2nd crime|Y is PC)
Pr(Y is PC)Pr(Y committed 2nd crime|Y is PC) + Pr(Y is not PC)Pr(Y committed
2nd crime|Y is not PC)
Id. at 69. This expression, which makes use of the notation introduced in note 147, is
greater than the prior probability of Y being a professional offender as long as professional
criminals have greater tendencies to commit crime.
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position of severe punishments to a group of criminals when it is
known that the proportion of professional criminals in that group is
high. From the preceding discussion, it follows that the proportion of
professional criminals is much higher among repeat offenders. This
implies that repeat offenders should be punished more severely than
first-time offenders.
It should be noted that this reasoning provides a rationale for the
common practice of tying criminal penalties to criminals’ prior rec194
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines structure punishment
ords.
schemes by increasing sentences for those with prior criminal activi195
Many states have “three strikes” laws, which require enhanced
ty.
punishments for criminals with a record of three or more serious of196
These practices are justified from a consequentialist perfenses.
spective. Prior criminal records indicate a greater likelihood that the
criminal has high criminal tendencies and has not committed a crime
197
due to some unexpected random event. This implies that the criminal is both more dangerous and often deterrable, and therefore
should be punished severely.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that this justification cannot be
derived under theories that rely on or assume constant criminal benefits. In such theories, a person’s criminal tendency is immediately revealed after he commits a crime. As such, it is neither possible nor
necessary to obtain further information regarding the offender’s
criminal tendencies. Therefore, the trade-off identified in the preceding parts of this Section, and accordingly the rationale justifying
more severe punishments for repeat offenders, disappears.
B. Remorse and Apologies
In Part IV, I explained how potential offenders’ criminal tendencies may fluctuate, and how a PDF may be used to describe the likelihood with which a potential offender commits crime. Although this
framework accounts for fluctuations in criminal tendencies over time,
it still generates a static framework. In other words, it assumes that a
potential offender has the same PDF over time. To study remorse,
this assumption can be replaced with a more realistic one under a dy-

194. See supra Part III.B.1.
195. See supra note 21.
196. See supra note 108.
197. See supra Part III.B.1.

210

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:156

namic setting. In particular, an offender’s PDF may piecewise shift
198
upon committing crime.
Shifts in PDFs are convenient and realistic ways to capture remorse. A person who feels truly sorry after committing a crime, presumably, and at least partially, loses his willingness to commit crime
199
and is likely to exert more control over his actions in the future.
Thus, he is less likely to commit crime in the future. As such, the
change in a remorseful offenders’ criminal attitude can be captured
by a shift in his PDF, as demonstrated in Figure 5 below.

198. See, e.g., Murat C. Mungan, A Note on the Effects of State-Dependent Benefits on Optimal
Law Enforcement, 6 REV. L. & ECON. 97 (2010) [hereinafter Mungan, State-Dependent Benefits]
(showing that if criminals’ benefits are dependent on the state then maximal fines need
not be optimal); Mungan, Apologies, supra note 24 (providing formal models where remorseful offenders derive disutility, in the form of guilty conscience). These models, unlike the model presented here, do not incorporate repeated interactions, and therefore
cannot capture the effects of such disutilities on future propensities to commit crime.
199. See Mungan, State-Dependent Benefits, supra note 198, at 98 (briefly reviewing the existing literature and concluding that “[i]n sum it has been documented that some individuals, if not all, feel a sense of guilt after committing a crime”); see also, e.g., JACOB ADLER,
THE URGINGS OF CONSCIENCE: A THEORY OF PUNISHMENT (1992); Michael S. Bernick, Of
Crime and Conscience, 68 A.B.A. J. 306 (1982); Stephanos Bibas, Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 329 (2007); Darren Bush, Law and Economics of Restorative Justice: Why Restorative Justice Cannot and Should Not Be Solely About Restoration 2003 UTAH L.
REV. 439; Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Crime, Confession, and the Counselor-At-Law: Lessons from
Dostoyevsky, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 327 (1998); John Tasioulas, Repentance and the Liberal State, 4
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 487 (2007); Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 184 (1997).

2012]

FLUCTUATING CRIMINAL TENDENCIES

211

Figure 5 demonstrates that a truly remorseful offender is less
likely to recidivate than a nonremorseful offender whose fluctuating
criminal tendencies remain unchanged and therefore is represented
by Curve I. Accordingly, the incapacitative benefits of punishing remorseful offenders are not as high as the corresponding benefits aris200
ing through the punishment of non-remorseful offenders. This implies that if it were possible to separate truly remorseful offenders
from those who are not, it would be optimal to punish remorseful of201
fenders less severely.
Remorse does not only signal that an offender’s criminal tendencies have been altered after committing a crime. It is plausible to assume that a person who has committed a crime due to some unexpected impulse is more likely to experience remorse than a
202
As such, the proportion of professional ofprofessional offender.
fenders among nonremorseful offenders is higher than the proportion of professional offenders among remorseful offenders. Therefore, as explained in Part V.A, the expected incapacitative and
deterrent benefits of punishing remorseful offenders are lower than
the corresponding expected benefits of punishing nonremorseful offenders. This implies that, if it were possible to separate truly re200. This follows from the fact that, in Figure 5, the area of the first zone lying under
Curve I is smaller than the corresponding area lying under Curve R.
201. This follows from the simple fact that punishment of remorseful offenders results
in smaller deterrent as well as incapacitative benefits, as implied by Figure 5.
202. I thank Mark Seidenfeld for making this point.
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morseful offenders from those who are not, it would be optimal to
punish remorseful offenders less severely.
It is impossible, however, to separate truly remorseful offenders
203
from those who are not. This impossibility, as I have demonstrated
204
in a previous article, may lead to substantial costs associated with
205
penalty reductions for those who convincingly display remorse. Incorporating the observation that remorseful offenders are less likely
to recidivate, and therefore that they ideally ought to be punished less
severely, generates a counter rationale as to why it may be desirable to
206
As such,
allow penalty reductions for seemingly sincere apologies.
incorporating dynamic and fluctuating criminal tendencies in economic analyses leads to a broader range of conditions under which
sentence reductions for those who convincingly display remorse is justified.
A second important implication of incorporating remorse
through dynamic fluctuating benefits is revealed when one makes the
observation that a repeat offender was most likely not remorseful after
his first offense, since it is unlikely for a remorseful offender to recidi207
vate. Therefore, a repeat offender is not likely to have experienced
remorse after his initial crime, and it is unlikely that a repeat offender
208
has a shifted PDF.
This observation provides an additional rationale as to why repeat offenders ought to be punished severely. The proportion of firsttime offenders who feel remorseful upon committing crime is expected to be much higher than the corresponding proportion of repeat offenders. Therefore, expected incapacitative benefits associated
with punishing repeat offenders is much higher than the incapacitative benefits of punishing first-time offenders. Hence, it is worth incurring greater punishment costs to imprison repeat offenders for
longer periods of time.

203. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
204. See Mungan, Apologies, supra note 24.
205. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
206. Mungan, Apologies, supra note 24.
207. See id. at 180 n.14 (“The unit cost of punishing a truly remorseful offender may be
smaller than punishing a non-remorseful offender, because the former may be less likely
to recidivate.”).
208. Recall that the shifted PDF is the one represented by Curve I in Figure 5.
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C. Voluntary Manslaughter
Existing L&E literature is not very successful in providing consequentialist justifications as to why heat of passion crimes should be
punished less severely. 209 When one considers fluctuating criminal
benefits and the incapacitation function of punishment, consequentialist theories providing rationales for penalty reductions for voluntary manslaughter can be strengthened significantly.
Recall Michael’s fluctuating criminal tendencies from Part IV:
Voluntary manslaughter presumably occurs when Michael has criminal tendencies falling under Zone III in Figure 4. For instance, if Michael finds his wife with another man, he may temporarily be unaware
210
of the expected punishment associated with attacking his wife or the
person with whom she is having an affair; therefore, he is undeterrable.
Since Michael is undeterrable under these circumstances, it
makes little sense, from a deterrence based L&E perspective, to pun211
In fact, if we were certain that every person
ish him for his crime.
killing his adulterous spouse was undeterrable at the time he committed the crime—again from a simple deterrence-based perspective—it
212
would be optimal to not punish any person for such crimes.
It is certainly much more realistic to assume that at least a proportion of people respond to incentives, even when confronted with
213
the unfortunate circumstance just described. In fact, it may be necessary to increase, rather than reduce, the sanction for voluntary manslaughter to deter people who respond to incentives but place a very
214
high value on inflicting pain on adulterous people.
This being the case, it is a priori and theoretically ambiguous
from a deterrence-based perspective, whether penalty reductions for
209. But see Part III.B.3, where I summarize a powerful argument presented by Posner.
Note that this argument, too, relies on a variant of fluctuating criminal tendencies.
210. See supra note 158.
211. One may argue that punishing him may result in benefits to the victim’s family,
relatives, and friends. Although this argument is somewhat convincing, it is certainly incomplete. Not punishing the offender results in similar benefits to the offender’s family,
relatives, and friends.
212. See supra Parts II.C–D.
213. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 310 (“[T]he common law paradigms of
‘adequate provocation’—adultery and humiliating but non-life-threatening blows to the
face—occur frequently without leading to deadly retaliation.”).
214. See supra notes 137–138 and accompanying text.
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voluntary manslaughter are justified, even when one accounts for
fluctuating criminal tendencies. The question ultimately becomes an
empirical one: Are the imprisonment cost savings from penalty reductions for voluntary manslaughter offset by the same reductions’ deter215
To the extent that we believe the answer to
rence-lowering effect?
this question is “no,” we have a consequentialist justification for penalty reductions for voluntary manslaughter in a purely deterrencebased framework.
Assuming, however, that we answer this question in the affirmative, a second consideration must be taken into account, namely the
incapacitation function of imprisonment. The limited L&E research
on incapacitation suggests that the benefit of incapacitation increases
216
Therefore, if the
with the imprisoned offender’s dangerousness.
expected dangerousness of a murderer is higher than the expected
dangerousness of a person who has committed voluntary manslaughter, a second rationale emerges as to why voluntary manslaughter
ought to be punished less severely.
It is reasonable to assume that individuals like Michael are more
217
likely to commit voluntary manslaughter than murder. As such, the
proportion of individuals who are likely to recidivate among murderers is higher than the corresponding proportion of individuals who
218
Therefore, the expected
have committed voluntary manslaughter.
dangerousness of a murderer is higher than the expected dangerousness of a person who has committed voluntary manslaughter.
This observation supplies a second, consequentialist reason as to
why penalty reductions for voluntary manslaughter make sense. Finally, for the sake of completeness, I will briefly propose a third, inde-

215. See supra Part II.C–D.
216. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
217. This follows from the assumption that circumstances pushing Michael’s criminal
tendencies to Zones 2 and 3 in Figure 4 are more likely to be products of extreme emotional stimuli. Therefore, a killing committed by Michael is more likely to constitute voluntary manslaughter than murder.
218. This reasoning implicitly makes a number of harmless suppositions. The most
important one is that the number of “dangerous” people being convicted for murder is at
least as great as the number of people being convicted for voluntary manslaughter. The
second one is that people like Michael are unlikely to recidivate, which follows from the
fact that Zones 2 and 3 in Figure 4 occupy small areas. Furthermore, to the extent that
people like Michael are likely to experience remorse, their probability of becoming recidivists falls even further.
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pendent rationale as to why voluntary manslaughter ought to be punished less severely, although this rationale is unrelated to the two sim219
ple observations that constitute the focus of this Article.
In general, precautions taken by victims to avoid harm are social220
ly wasteful. In the case of voluntary manslaughter, to the contrary,
they can be socially beneficial. In the context of voluntary manslaughter, the precautionary activity on the victims’ side would correspond to not provoking the potential offender. To the extent that
221
such provocation is socially costly, its prevention is socially benefi222
Therefore, ceteris paribus, the existence of such social benefits
cial.

219. These observations are: (1) that people exert varying degrees of control over their
actions over time, and (2) that imprisonment has an incapacitation effect.
220. A common example is the installation of an alarm system to protect one’s house
from theft. For related literature on costly precautionary activity by potential victims, see
Steven Shavell, Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft: Private Versus Socially Optimal Behavior,
11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 123 (1991). Specifically, he says:
Individuals act in a variety of ways to protect their property against theft: they
lock their doors, purchase alarm systems, hire guards, and so forth. The things
that individuals do on their own to reduce theft are of substantial importance. It
is notable that private expenditures on security from crime exceed public expenditures.
Id. at 123 (citing William C. Cunningham & Todd H. Taylor, The Growing Role of Private Security, NAT’L INSTS. JUSTICE, RESEARCH IN BRIEF (1984), for the proposition that “private
expenditures on security from crime exceed public expenditures”)); Gordon Tullock, The
Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224, 231 (1967) (“The total social
cost of theft is the sum of the efforts invested in the activity of theft, private protection
against theft, and the public investment in police protection.”); Keith N. Hylton, Optimal
Law Enforcement and Victim Precaution, 27 RAND J. ECON. 197 (1996) (extending the analysis
of costly precautionary activity by potential victims). Other secondary or indirect effects of
criminal law rules and standards on parties other than potential criminals are explored in
the existing literature to some extent. See, e.g., Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1181
(1994) [hereinafter Harel, Comparative Fault].
221. Provocation may, for instance, involve insulting the potential offender, causing
him distress.
222. See Harel, Comparative Fault, supra note 220, at 1215–16 (raising a similar point).
This observation presents an alternative explanation to Kahan and Nussbaum’s proffered
explanation as to why the common law categorizes provocation the way it does. See Kahan
& Nussbaum, supra note 10, at 312 (“From the common law provocation categories, for
example, it can be inferred that the law does not attach as much value to the life of the

216

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:156

provides a third consequentialist rationale for punishing voluntary
manslaughter less severely.
D. The Role of Fluctuating Criminal Tendencies and Incapacitation
The rationales provided for these three selected criminal law
practices share a commonality: they exploit information revealed
through various aspects of the crime or characteristics of the criminal.
By using such information, one can use a Bayesian belief updating
223
process to re-evaluate the likelihood that the criminal is dangerous.
Since incapacitative benefits are greater for more dangerous offenders, the more dangerous the criminal, the longer he ought to be imprisoned.
Fluctuating criminal tendencies play a key role in this reasoning.
It is only because criminal tendencies are fluctuating that one cannot
conclude from the mere fact that an offender committed a crime that
224
Because of the uncertainty created by
he is sufficiently dangerous.
the existence of fluctuating criminal tendencies, one should hesitate
to impose harsh punishments on individuals and question whether
the offender will repeat his wrongs in the future.
VI. SUMMARY & CONCLUSION
Economic analyses of criminal law are criticized for invoking unrealistic assumptions and performing poorly in providing rationales
225
These criticisms may lead
for a number of criminal law doctrines.
legal scholars to be skeptical about the usefulness of conclusions
226
In this Article, I
drawn from economic analyses of criminal law.
demonstrate that the poor performance of economic analyses in
providing rationales for various criminal law doctrines is not the result
of some inherent flaw in its methodology, but instead a result of its
oversimplified assumptions.
Existing normative economic analyses apply consequentialism
narrowly by focusing on deterrence as the single justification for punishment, and by implicitly or explicitly assuming that potential of-

paramour as it does to the life of the average person, and for that reason it invests less in
punishing emotions that promote killings of the former.”).
223. See supra note 193.
224. See supra Part V.A.
225. See supra Parts I, III.B.
226. See supra Parts I, II.B.
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fenders’ tendency to commit crime remains constant over time. By
relaxing these two assumptions, and replacing them with simple, yet
more realistic alternatives, economic analyses can perform much bet228
In
ter in providing rationales for existing criminal law practices.
particular, economic analyses perform much better when they replace
the assumption of constant criminal tendencies with fluctuating criminal tendencies, and incorporate the fact that the incapacitation func229
tion of imprisonment contributes to reductions in crime. As pointed out in this Article, these replacements can be made by employing
230
An economic model that
existing tools in modern economics.
makes these simple adjustments can provide strong rationales for per231
vasive criminal law practices.
232
These rationales focus on a Bayesian belief updating process.
When fluctuating criminal tendencies are considered, the mere fact
that a person has committed a crime reveals imperfect information
233
Therefore, circumstances surrounding
about his dangerousness.
the crime reveal important pieces of information that can be used to
234
Since inupdate beliefs concerning an offender’s dangerousness.
capacitative benefits are greater for more dangerous offenders, the
stronger we believe—based on circumstances surrounding the
crime—that the criminal is dangerous, the longer we are willing to
235
imprison him.
By relying on these rationales, this Article demonstrates that the
poor performance of economic analyses in providing explanations for
a number of criminal law practices is something that can be remedied
by focusing on a broader application of consequentialist theories of
236
punishment. Although this Article focuses on three selected issues
in criminal law—repeat offender laws, voluntary manslaughter laws,
and punishment of remorseful offenders—the model proposed ap-

227. See supra Part III.
228. See supra Part IV.
229. See supra Part IV.
230. See supra Parts IV, V.
231. See supra Part V.
232. See supra Parts IV, V.
233. See supra Parts IV, V.
234. See supra Parts IV, V.
235. See supra Part V.A.
236. See supra Part V.
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pears capable of explaining the social desirability of other pervasive
principles and doctrines in criminal law.
Consider, for instance, the mens rea requirement in criminal law.
This Article provides a framework to conceptualize this requirement
237
as an information-exploiting device. A criminal’s mental state while
committing a harmful act reveals information about his likelihood of
recidivating. Applying the insights identified in this Article suggests
that criminals should be punished in proportion to the intentionality
of their acts. I have not, however, provided a complete model to integrate the mens rea requirement into economic analyses of criminal
law. This is an interesting and promising area for future research.

237. See supra Part V.

